the weekly Standard

JULY 26, 2004

$3.95

JOE WILSON'S "LITERARY FLAIR"
MATTHEW CONTINETTI

OUR MAN IN BAGHDAD

Fred Barnes on the unsung achievements of Paul Bremer

**********AUTO**5-DIGIT 94301
#UNZ0555B096 1#302604 WK 7502 0001
RON UNZ DEC 06 04 000095
371 537
555 BRYANT ST
PALO ALTO CA 94301-1704

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WHEN OUR TELECOM LAWS WERE WRITTEN,
"HOT SPOT" MEANT SOUTH BEACH.

Instant wireless access and other innovative technologies offer us better ways to work and play. It's a whole new world in telecommunications.

It's time for the laws to catch up with our lives.

YOUR LOCAL TELECOM COMPANIES WANT TO BRING YOU THE FUTURE...*FASTER.*

USTA
UNITED STATES TELECOM ASSOCIATION

www.thefuturefaster.com

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Contents

July 26, 2004 • Volume 9, Number 43

2 Scrapbook ..... *Kerry-Edwards and Steven J. Hatfill.*

4 Casual ..... *Jonathan V. Last, born loser.*

6 Correspondence. . . . . *On Baptists, Clinton, and Moore.*

9 Editorial . . . . . *The 9/11 Commission and the Connection*

Articles

11 The Missing Link *What the Senate report really says about Iraq and al Qaeda.* . . . . . BY STEPHEN F. HAYES

13 Less Central, More Intelligent? *How not to reform the CIA.* . . . . . BY GARY SCHMITT

15 The Conservative Case for Cheney *And why he won't be dumped.* . . . . . BY STEPHEN MOORE & JEFFREY BELL

17 What Unites Europeans? *Antipathy to the United Europe project.* . . . . . BY GERARD BAKER

19 The Moral Low Ground *Judges from a variety of unsavory regimes complain about Israel's fence.* . . . . . BY MAX BOOT

Cover: Landov/MAI/Myles Cullen

Features

21 Our Man in Baghdad

The unsung achievements of Paul Bremer. . . . . . BY FRED BARNES

25 "A Little Literary Flair"

Joe Wilson wasn't a truth-teller. . . . . . BY MATTHEW CONTINETTI

29 The Turkey Paradox

Joining Europe means becoming more Islamist. . . . . . BY CHRISTOPHER CALDWELL

Books & Arts

35 Bad Poet, Bad Man *A hundred years of Pablo Neruda.* . . . . . BY STEPHEN SCHWARTZ

38 Life, Italian Style *An Englishman looks at Italy and sees the horror, the horror.* . . . . . BY STEPHEN BARBARA

39 Art for Art's Sake *Why Terry Teachout is a great critic.* . . . . . BY KELLY JANE TORRANCE

40 Death Duties *The role of religion in the rise of eugenics.* . . . . . BY WESLEY J. SMITH

43 THE STANDARD READER . . . . . *New books on life in the South and the election of 1912.*

44 Parody. . . . . *Chris Matthews plays hardball with Saddam Hussein.*

William Kristol, *Editor* **Fred Barnes,** *Executive Editor*
David Tell, *Opinion Editor* **Christopher Caldwell, Andrew Ferguson,** *Senior Editors* **Richard Starr, Claudia Winkler,** *Managing Editors*
Joseph Bottum, *Books & Arts Editor* **Matt Labash,** *Senior Writer* **Stephen F. Hayes,** *Staff Writer*
Victorino Matus, David Skinner, *Assistant Managing Editors* **Jonathan V. Last,** *Online Editor*
Matthew Continetti, Katherine Mangu-Ward, *Reporters* **Duncan Currie, Rachel DiCarlo, Erin Montgomery,** *Editorial Assistants*
Lev Nisnevitch, *Art Director* **Philip Chalk,** *Production Director*
Gerard Baker, Max Boot, Tucker Carlson, John J. DiIulio Jr., Noemie Emery, Joseph Epstein, David Frum, David Gelernter, Reuel Marc Gerecht
Brit Hume, Robert Kagan, Charles Krauthammer, Tod Lindberg, P. J. O'Rourke, John Podhoretz, Irwin M. Stelzer, *Contributing Editors*
Terry Eastland, *Publisher* **Peter Dunn,** *Associate Publisher*
Nicholas H.B. Swezey, *Advertising & Marketing Manager* **Don Eugenio,** *Midwest Advertising Manager* **Mark Krawiec,** *New York Advertising Manager*
Lauren Trotta Husted, *Circulation Director* **Tina Winston,** *Finance Director* **Catherine Titus Lowe,** *Publicity Director*
Taybor Cook, Carolyn Wimmer, *Executive Assistants* **Michael Goldfarb,** *Staff Assistant*

the weekly Standard

THE WEEKLY STANDARD (ISSN 1083-3013) is published weekly (except the first week in January, the second week in July, the second week in August, and the second week in September) by News America Incorporated, 1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10036. Periodicals postage paid at New York, NY, and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to THE WEEKLY STANDARD, P.O. Box 96127, Washington, DC 20077-7767. For subscription customer service in the United States, call 1-800-274-7293. For new subscription orders, please call 1-800-283-2014. Subscribers: Please send new subscription orders to THE WEEKLY STANDARD, P.O. Box 96153, Washington, DC 20090-6153; changes of address to THE WEEKLY STANDARD, P.O. Box 96127, Washington, DC 20077-7767. Please include your latest magazine mailing label. Allow 3 to 5 weeks for arrival of first copy and address changes. Yearly subscriptions, $78.00. Canadian/foreign orders require additional postage and must be paid in full prior to commencement of service. Canadian/foreign subscribers may call 1-902-563-4723 for subscription inquiries. Visa/MasterCard payment accepted. Cover price, $3.95. Back issues, $3.95 (includes postage and handling). Send letters to the editor to THE WEEKLY STANDARD, 1150 17th Street, N.W., Suite 505, Washington, DC 20036-4617. For a copy of THE WEEKLY STANDARD Privacy Policy, visit www.weeklystandard.com or write to Customer Service, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, 1150 17th St., NW, Suite 505, Washington, D.C. 20036. THE WEEKLY STANDARD Advertising Sales Office in Washington, DC, is 1-202-293-4900. Advertising Production: Call Nicholas H.B. Swezey 1-202-496-3355. Midwest Advertising Sales: 1-312-953-7236. Copyright 2004, News America Incorporated. All rights reserved. No material in THE WEEKLY STANDARD may be reprinted without permission of the copyright owner. THE WEEKLY STANDARD is a trademark of News America Incorporated.

BPA INTERNATIONAL

www.weeklystandard.com

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Strong Odor

What exquisite timing these Kerry-Edwards people have, don't they? Like Alfred Hitchcock or something: With just seconds to spare, right when you were getting ready to pretty much explode from the suspense, the Democratic National Convention Committee last week—ta-daaaah!—"unveiled the thematic framework for the 2004 Democratic National Convention." Got a pencil? Good, because it turns out the thematic framework in question is a complicated one, and you'll want to mark your calendar appropriately. No two evenings of the Democratic convention will be the same, thematic framework-wise: "Using speakers, videos, and other programmatic elements," organizers will actually "amplify several themes over the course of the four-day" proceedings.

On Monday, July 26, for example, "the Convention will highlight the Kerry-Edwards plan to make America strong at home and respected in the world." It seems that both gentlemen "believe that a stronger America begins with a strong economy." But they "also know that to be strong at home, America must be respected in the world." So a Kerry-Edwards administration will "strengthen our military" and "lead strong alliances." Among the featured speakers Monday evening will be Rep. Stephanie Tubbs-Jones of Ohio, who will explain the Democratic party's plan for a "stronger economy," and Rep. Bob Menendez of New Jersey, who will discuss the campaign's innovative proposals to "strengthen America's position in the world."

Things will take a dramatically different turn on Tuesday the 27th, when the convention will celebrate John Kerry's lifetime of "strength and service." You may not be aware of this, but "John Kerry's life reflects strength," among other fine attributes. So Tuesday evening, various "speakers will talk about John Kerry's lifetime of strength and service."

Wednesday, the focus will shift to the need for "a stronger, more secure America." Only John Kerry and John Edwards have "the strength of character and toughness" to achieve that noble goal, and they'll do so by "building a strong military" and "strengthening international alliances." Look for Wednesday night's speakers to offer more specifics about "the Kerry-Edwards path to a strong and more secure America."

Finally, on Thursday evening, "John Kerry will address the nation" and pledge to "build an America that is stronger at home and respected in the world." Mind you, Kerry will "also talk about his optimistic vision to build a stronger America" and his commitment to "strengthening faith, family, and freedom." Introducing Kerry will be former senator Max Cleland of Georgia, who'll testify that the Democratic nominee "can be trusted to lead America to safer and stronger times." And as a special treat, some time before the night is done, one of Kerry's Vietnam-era military buddies will be on hand to reminisce about his friend's "strength of character."

THE SCRAPBOOK is impressed. An ordinary presidential candidate might shrink from such an ambitious and complicated program for fear of confusing his audience. But Kerry is clearly made of stronger stuff. ♦

Stronger Than *Last* Time, Anyhow

There was one other piece of totally surprising, attention-grabbing news from the Kerry-Edwards team last week. On July 15, the Democratic campaign announced that it had "accepted the Commission on Presidential Debates' 2004 debate schedule."

No, silly, that in itself was not a surprise. Nor was it a surprise, as this second Kerry-Edwards press release pointed out, that the Republican campaign hadn't yet offered a comparable scheduling commitment. Bush is always pulling stunts like this, after all. You'll remember, for example, how "in 2000, the Bush campaign agreed to a series of three presidential debates at the last minute, deliberately stalling so as to lower expectations about Bush's debate skills and performance." And we all know what happened after that.

It's just that we wouldn't have expected the Kerry-Edwards campaign to be so brutally candid about it. "In the end," their July 15 statement concluded, "Bush was declared the winner of each of the three debates against Vice President Al Gore."

Gore, incidentally—notwithstanding the fact that he somehow managed to lose three straight debates to that lummox Bush—will nevertheless be making his own featured appearance at the Democratic convention in Boston. He's slotted for Monday night, along with that other famous symbol of Democratic party strength, Jimmy Carter.

As we say, this thematic framework business is complicated. ♦

Hatfill v. *Kristof*

By means of a lengthy complaint filed Tuesday, July 13, with the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, biodefense researcher Dr. Steven J. Hatfill—remember him?—has finally, as long expected, sued the *New York Times* and its columnist Nicholas D. Kristof for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Hatfill is asking for both actual and punitive damages in connection with a series of *Times* columns Kristof published in 2002, columns which all but explicitly pronounced Hatfill guilty of the previous year's ghastly string of anthrax-by-mail terrorist murders. Should he prove his case on the merits, Hatfill's plea for damages against Kristof and the *Times*—who did more than anyone else to retail various purportedly incriminating "facts" about the scientist's character and background—would seem to be a strong one. Just for starters, Hatfill, made indelibly notorious by Kristof's columns, hasn't been able to find a single day's paid work since those columns first appeared.

Interestingly, the *Times* has responded to Hatfill's lawsuit with precisely the sort of highhanded recklessness that he's alleging against them to begin with. "We believe this case does not have merit," says Toby Usnik of the paper's corporate communications office.

> Mr. Kristof began a series of columns in July of 2002, criticizing the FBI for its response to the anthrax crisis. At that time, Dr. Hatfill had already been publicly identified as a person of interest in the investigation. While encouraging the FBI to investigate the matter, Mr. Kristof was careful to note that Dr. Hatfill was presumed to be innocent and that the FBI owed it to him to clear his name if they had no evidence.

Mr. Usnik is seriously misinformed. First off, Kristof began his series of columns on Hatfill in May 2002, not July—as he himself would later acknowledge in one of those columns that August ("Since May, I've written periodically about a former U.S. Army scientist who, authorities say privately, has become the overwhelming focus of the investigation into the anthrax attacks last fall"). Furthermore, Hatfill had most definitely *not* been publicly identified as an FBI "person of interest" before Kristof started writing about the subject—that wouldn't happen until the final week of June 2002. And last but not least, while it is true that Kristof did eventually wind up weakly endorsing a "genuine assumption that [Hatfill] is an innocent man caught in a nightmare," the *Times* had already by then published several months' worth of Kristof's lurid gossip-mongering about the poor man—and a number of other publications, including this one, had already raised serious questions about whether that gossip had any genuine evidentiary basis.

In reply to a charge that it's gotten its facts wrong, the *Times* gets its facts wrong. Round one to Dr. Steven J. Hatfill. ♦

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Casual

Brotherly Losers

My name is Jonathan and I'm a Philly fan. In 1995, the Philadelphia Eagles made what was then the biggest free-agent signing in sports, acquiring star running back Ricky Watters for $6.9 million per year. In his first game as an Eagle, Watters found his new team losing in the fourth quarter to the Tampa Bay Buccaneers. Quarterback Randall Cunningham (I once went trick-or-treating at his house) threw a pass to him over the middle, and as the ball neared, Watters saw defensive backs fast approaching. He put his hands up and, instead of catching the ball, batted it down.

After the game reporters asked Watters why he'd refused to catch the pass. He explained that the Eagles were probably going to lose and he saw no reason to take a hit in the middle of the field. "For who?" Watters asked defiantly. "For what?"

It was an enduring and iconic moment. Today, Watters is long gone, but "For who? For what?" remains part of the city's lexicon.

No town has a more heartbreaking sports history than Philadelphia. For 21 years—nearly my entire life—the city has gone without a champion of any kind—in baseball, basketball, football, or hockey. Growing up just a few minutes from the City of Brotherly Love, I am one whose heart has been broken so often that it has hardened to stone. Or maybe disappeared altogether.

When Smarty Jones faltered in the final stretch of the Belmont Stakes a few weeks ago, failing to win the Triple Crown, no one from Philadelphia was surprised; we're used to losing.

We've taken it hard. Philadelphians are renowned for acts of ill humor, and in my time I've seen a lot. Top prospect J.D. Drew was drafted by the Phillies. He chose to sit out of baseball for a year rather than play for Philadelphia. Eventually he signed with the St. Louis Cardinals, and fans threw batteries at him the first time he came to town.

Others got worse. On a trip to Philadelphia in the early 1980s, the unofficial mascot from the Washington Redskins was accosted and wound up in the hospital.

Darren Gygi

In December 1989 the Dallas Cowboys visited, and Eagles fans—encouraged by city district attorney (and future mayor and governor) Ed Rendell—pelted their coach with snowballs.

In 2001, the '76ers made it to the NBA Finals, where they faced the Los Angeles Lakers. During Game 4, fans booed the halftime entertainment because one of the singers was wearing a Lakers jersey. The Lakers won the series behind the sharp-shooting of Kobe Bryant. Bryant grew up just outside of Philadelphia. That didn't help. The following season, the NBA held its all-star game in Philly and Bryant was awarded MVP honors. The fans booed him mercilessly.

The best-known booing in sports history took place in Philadelphia on December 15, 1968, as the Eagles battled the Minnesota Vikings. Santa Claus was circling the field, waving to the crowd. Fed up with another losing season (the Eagles were 2-12), the fans booed Santa.

So Matthew Scott should have known what he was getting into. Matthew had undergone the first successful hand transplant performed in the United States and was chosen by the Phillies to throw out the first pitch of the 1999 season. His toss fell short of home plate. The good people of Philadelphia booed him, too.

All of which made the recent news almost comforting in its constancy. The Phillies opened a splendid new ballpark this season, and the architects tried hard to make it "fan friendly." For instance, they built the home team's bullpen 10 feet away from a balcony, so that people could gather to watch their favorite pitchers warm up. The visitors' bullpen was tucked away, out of sight.

This arrangement lasted but a short while. Instead of admiring the home-team pitchers, fans congregated around the bullpen and heckled them. Just two games into the *preseason*, Phillies pitchers had had enough of their fans. The hecklers were so vicious *to their own team* that the Phillies swapped bullpens with the visitors. Only in Philadelphia.

There are questions of cause and effect: Do Philadelphians boo because they lose, or do they lose because they boo? The Catholic in me wants to believe that losing is cosmic justice; that we deserve it because we're so prickly.

But the romantic in me believes that all the booing and heckling and battery-throwing is caused by the losing. The fans boo because they still care. Philadelphians may be the last people in America who have refused to accept sport as mere entertainment. They believe that the games mean something, that athletics is an important part of the human condition, and that it matters whether you win or lose.

Jonathan V. Last

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

How I saved my own life.

BOB

My name is Bob and I'm an ex-smoker. I quit smoking a few months ago. I'd tried quitting before, but with the help of the experts at the American Legacy Foundation this time was different. Because they helped me come up with a plan to quit. That was the big thing. A plan – which I stuck to.

I set a Quit Date, visited my doctor, used the patch religiously and began writing in a journal. I even started working out again. Trying so many different things is one of the reasons I'm still smoke-free. That along with the love and support of my family and friends.

It wasn't easy, and it's still a struggle every day. But now you can see what I went through by going to my Web site, bobquits.com. The American Legacy Foundation put the site together so other people could see how my plan worked and learn how they can quit, too. The site details my entire quitting experience, including my daily journals and video diaries. You can get your own quit plan by calling Legacy at 1-800-399-5589. Yeah, quitting was hard. But it can be done. You just need a plan.

BOBQUITS.COM

Legacy
American Legacy Foundation®

2004 American Legacy Foundation

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Portrait of the Artist

I liked Matt Labash's review of *Fahrenheit 9/11* ("Un-Moored from Reality," July 5/July 12), but the distinction Labash drew throughout the piece—that Moore makes "fudge," not art—is not precise enough.

All art is, to a certain extent, "fudge"—but it must be made from a consistent recipe. Moore's failing is that he claims to make documentaries, which are journalistic by nature, rather than satires. Satires, while based in fact, are inherently artistic. In his early films, he is enough of a satirist that his particular slant is acceptable, despite the fact that some might find it disagreeable.

But ever since *Bowling for Columbine*, and especially with *Fahrenheit 9/11*, Moore has ceased to be honest about what he is doing. As Labash rightly points out, his great failure is that he is dishonest. Certain people may consider his new anti-Bush screed an authentic documentary. But we should never confuse Moore's pseudo-art with genuine journalism. If Moore were to call himself an artist, we'd have less of a problem with his mendacity. Unfortunately, he claims a journalistic pedigree while peddling utter "fudge" as truth.

Gregory A. Borse
Peru, IN

Having just seen *Fahrenheit 9/11*, I am forced to agree with much of Matt Labash's critique. The movie is filled with distortions and propaganda. However, as detailed and thorough as Labash's article is, it somehow avoids any mention of the film's central (and, to my mind, inarguable) point—that wars are consistently fought by the poor at the behest of the rich.

Ben Bartlett
Los Angeles, CA

I greatly appreciated Matt Labash's take on *Fahrenheit 9/11*. Since I have previously seen such Michael Moore "documentaries" as *Bowling for Columbine* and *Roger & Me*, I am not at all surprised that the filmmaker's ego has once again trivialized the very subject he claims to elevate.

Bob McGovern
Atlanta, GA

Self-Parodying *Times*

In William Kristol's editorial on the *New York Times* and Iraq-al Qaeda ties ("Good *Times*, Bad *Times*," July 5/July 12), the nine-paragraph excerpt from Thom Shanker's front-page *Times* article should have been on the Not a Parody page.

Shanker refers to Osama bin Laden, the leader of an international terrorist organization responsible for murdering thousands of innocents, as "Mr. Bin Laden" no fewer than ten times in the excerpt.

Mister bin Laden! You just can't make this stuff up.

Jerome S. Shipman
Potomac, MD

Baptists and Marriage

I wish to applaud Mark D. Tooley's very encouraging piece ("Methodists and Marriage," July 5/July 12) on the bold, unambiguous stand that the United Methodists took this year against solemnizing same-sex unions in their churches.

I must point out, however, that "the first mainline church to adopt a political stance on same-sex unions" was not the United Methodists in 2004, but the Southern Baptists in 1996. I am a professor of Christian Ethics at Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary, and I drafted the "Resolution on Homosexual Marriage" that was passed enthusiastically by Southern Baptists at our convention in New Orleans that year.

Just because mainline Baptists took a political stand against same-sex marriage so early in the national debate is no reason their stand should be forgotten as another mainline denomination closes ranks today.

Daniel R. Heimbach
Wake Forest, NC

Lincoln's Patriotism

Andrew Ferguson's review of *Why Lincoln Matters* ("Cuomo's Lincoln," July 5/July 12) is masterful. But I would like to provide one correction and one clarification about Abraham Lincoln's opposition to the Mexican-American War.

The war began in 1846, not 1848, as stated in Ferguson's article. And while Lincoln was indeed opposed to the war when it began, he did not believe in launching vituperative criticism of a sitting administration while American soldiers were still in harm's way.

Consider what Lincoln said on the floor of the House on January 12, 1848: "When the war began, it was my opinion that all those who, because of knowing too little, or because of knowing too much, could not conscientiously approve the conduct of the president, in the beginning of it, should, nevertheless, as good citizens and patriots, remain silent on that point, at least till the war should be ended."

One wonders what Lincoln would have made of President Bush's critics today.

Jose A. Hernandez
Coral Gables, FL

O for a Muse of Fire

Noemie Emery's article on Jimmy Carter ("The Muse of Malaise," July 5/July 12) was fantastic, and much appreciated. Ever since the 2000 election debacle I've wanted to ask President Carter why he never traveled to Florida then to "observe" the election proceedings, as he has done throughout the world. Perhaps it was a case of faulty priorities. Or perhaps he didn't want to visit

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Untold Story of the Remarkable Rise of the Bush Dynasty



"THE SCHWEIZERS HAVE PENETRATED TO THE HEART OF THE BUSH FAMILY. This is as close as anyone has ever been able to get." That's the assessment of Doug Wead, a former aide to both Bush presidents, about Peter and Rochelle Schweizer's ***The Bushes: Portrait of a Dynasty***. In this first full-scale biography of the Bushes, the Schweizers show why the Bushes have quietly come to outshine even the Kennedys in their power and influence on the American scene.



In this illuminating book, the Schweizers disclose never-before-revealed information about the inner workings of the Bush clan—including the sibling rivalry between George W. and Jeb; divisions between father and son over the Iraq war; and Jeb's plans to take on Hillary and run for President in 2008. The Schweizers also delve into the Bushes' secret business dealings and detail how their shrewd alliances with other American dynasties—including the Kennedys, Rockefellers and Tafts—have all helped to consolidate their power within the Republican Party.

Above all, we see George W. Bush as his family sees him: an intensely driven, deeply religious man with a patriot's heart. Relying on statements from close Bush family members, the Schweizers explain how the President deals with the stresses of the war on terrorism, how he sees it as a religious war, and how his profound Christian faith influences what he says and does.

The Bushes highlights the qualities that have made this family more successful than any other political family in American history—and assures them a long future on our nation's political stage.

SHOW YOUR SUPPORT FOR GEORGE W. BUSH BY WEARING THE "BUSH-CHENEY" 2004 BALL CAP.

Benefits of Membership and How the Book Club Works

INSTANT SAVINGS! Join today and get *The Bushes* for just $7.95 and the "Bush-Cheney" 2004 Ball Cap absolutely FREE, plus shipping and handling. Then take up to one year to buy two more books at regular low Club prices (20-50% below retail). After you have paid for your books, your Membership can be ended by you or the Club. Plus you will also get the opportunities to buy from our list of Superbargain books that the Club regularly offers. These books are offered at 70-90% discounts!! (Sorry, Superbargain books don't count toward your book commitment).

SHOP AT HOME CONVENIENCE! Up to 16 times a year you will receive the Club Bulletin packed with the kind of books you will want to read and own. Each Bulletin will describe a Featured Selection chosen just for our Members. Also included are a number of alternate selections about politics, religion, history, home schooling, investing, and other areas of interest to conservatives.

CBC ONLINE! You can now read about and conveniently order CBC books from our website at www.conservativebookclub.com. Same discounts apply, of course. And, with regularly scheduled live chats with our authors and members-only bulletin board, you can keep up with the conservative community on a range of important issues.

100% SATISFACTION GUARANTEED! If you are not completely satisfied with any book, return it and receive a complete credit. Plus you will always have at least ten days to make your decision to receive the Featured Selection. If you ever have less than ten days, you simply return the book at Club expense for a full credit. One Membership per household please

☑ **YES!** Please enroll me as a member of the Conservative Book Club under the terms outlined in this ad. Send *The Bushes* for just $7.95 and the "Bush-Cheney" 2004 Ball Cap **FREE**, plus shipping and handling. I then need to buy only two additional books over the next year at regularly discounted Club prices (20-50% off retail).

C1331-AZ

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Email _____

• Prices slightly higher in Canada • Membership subject to approval by the Conservative Book Club

Fill out this coupon and mail to:

CONSERVATIVE BOOK CLUB®
Conservatives Serving Conservatives for 40 Years

1151 **PO Box 97196, Washington, DC 20090-7196**

CBC1
6451
6246

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Florida because he would have been forced to conclude that the Democrats were trying to steal the election!

FRANCES PUCKETT
Penney Farms, FL

SPINNING SADDAM

WILLIAM KRISTOL was right on with his editorial "Anti-anti-Saddam-ism" (June 28). The spin that much of the media placed on the 9/11 Commission's preliminary report is deplorable, to say the least. Kristol's insistence that John Kerry must clearly explain his position regarding the original decision to invade Iraq is quite correct.

In fact, Bush should challenge Kerry to do so, and at the same time issue a public challenge to the media to find a single instance where anyone in the Bush administration claimed explicitly that Iraq was involved in planning the 9/11 attacks.

JACK OTT
Lakewood, CO

CLINTON'S WAR

IN FRED BARNES'S "The Shrinking Clinton Presidency" (June 28), I was surprised to read that Bill Clinton claims credit for the toppling of Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic. He did no such thing. During the Kosovo war, his administration never made Milosevic's ouster an explicit goal of U.S. policy. Clinton emissaries such as Richard Holbrooke instead treated Milosevic as a legitimate negotiating partner.

Although the administration kept repeating that "Milosevic is the problem," the NATO operation was a limited war aimed at stopping ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. It was not aimed at forcing regime change in Serbia. Indeed, the war ended not with Milosevic's surrender of power, but with his signature on yet another paper agreement.

The Serbian leader finally lost power in the fall of 2000 as the result of domestic political developments. Clinton may retort that the Kosovo war weakened Milosevic and thereby made him vulnerable to a domestic opposition, but this doesn't appear to be true either. During the war itself, NATO bombing of targets in Belgrade caused the Serbian people to rally behind Milosevic. A whole year after the war ended, there was still no sign that Milosevic's grip on power was weakening.

Eventually, it was President Bush, not Clinton, who successfully pressured the new Serb government to turn Milosevic over to the Hague Tribunal.

MARK JUBULIS
Erie, PA

MILE-HIGH MISCHIEF

IN "ROCKY MOUNTAIN HIJINKS" (June 28), THE SCRAPBOOK correctly points out that the Bush reelection team should pay attention to a Colorado ballot initiative that would modify the state's Electoral College allocation formula. According to the Constitution, state electors are chosen "in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct," which may or may not allow changes by popular vote.

As with the issues litigated in Florida in 2000, a controversy could arise over whether Colorado's Electoral College rules can be altered retroactively after voting has already occurred. Indeed, this would presumably happen if folks went to the polls with a winner-take-all system in place and then the results of the ballot initiative certified a change to a proportional-allocation system. Perhaps the Bush administration's lawyers should pay attention, as well.

PAUL H. BLACKMAN
Arlington, VA

A PUNITIVE LEGACY

KUDOS TO JAMES PIERESON for his essay, "Punitive Liberalism" (June 28). I have never read a more concise and insightful political history of the period since John F. Kennedy's presidency. Piereson trenchantly describes the outcome of the left's ascendancy during the Carter years.

A contemporary vestige of Punitive Liberalism is the doctrine of so-called multiculturalism, which similarly undercuts our national greatness. Some liberals have even tried to disseminate the idea that multiculturalism is responsible in large measure for our success, using slogans such as "it's what made our country great."

This seemingly benign slogan obscures the real reason for America's greatness: namely, an ideology and a Constitution that promote and sustain freedom on every level, and a system that allows every individual to realize his full potential, no matter what his ethnic origins. Diversity is surely one of the results of our national greatness, but not the cause.

MIKE CRONE
Monroe, GA

REBELS WITHOUT A CLUE

MATTHEW CONTINETTI'S narrative of "Progressive Summer Camp" (June 14) could form the framework of a telling novel on American decline. The befuddled people Continetti describes have no idea of their hard-won heritage or what brought them to such perverse, indulgent frolics. Hidden in the recesses of the Marriott Wardman Park hotel, now entertaining a pampered generation of leftists, are ghosts of citizens from earlier ages. That the historic old hotel is now used by errant young "reformers" dissatisfied with their lot and carving careers out of complaint says little for the material progress their ancestors bequeathed them.

W. EDWARD CHYNOWETH
Sanger, CA

• • •

THE WEEKLY STANDARD
welcomes letters to the editor.
Letters will be edited for length and clarity and must include the writer's name, address, and phone number.
All letters should be addressed:
Correspondence Editor
THE WEEKLY STANDARD
1150 17th St., NW, Suite 505
Washington, DC 20036.

You may also fax letters: (202) 293-4901
or email: editor@weeklystandard.com.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the weekly Standard

The 9/11 Commission and the Connection

The final report from the 9/11 Commission is scheduled to be released this Thursday. It will be a dense thicket of chronology, narrative, analysis, and proposals for reform. But one issue is likely to be prominent in the news coverage. In fact, it already has been. "9/11 Report Is Said to Dismiss Iraq-Qaeda Alliance." That was the headline over a July 12 *New York Times* report.

We hope the *Times* is mistaken. It doesn't have a great track record on the issue, insisting (erroneously) that the commission's staff statement last month found "No Qaeda-Iraq Tie." The vague language of the staff statement lent itself to misreporting. Most problematic was its declaration that repeated contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda "do not appear to have resulted in a collaborative relationship."

Almost immediately, the commission's co-chairmen qualified that finding. When the *Times* and others claimed that the staff statement "sharply contradicted" claims of a connection from the White House and Vice President Dick Cheney, Democratic co-chairman Lee Hamilton strongly objected:

> I must say I have trouble understanding the flak over this. The vice president is saying, I think, that there were connections between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein's government. We don't disagree with that. What we have said is just what [Republican co-chairman Tom Kean] just said: We don't have any evidence of a cooperative or collaborative relationship between Saddam Hussein's government and al Qaeda *with regard to the attacks on the United States*. So it seems to me that the sharp differences that the press has drawn, that the media has drawn, are not that apparent to me. [Emphasis added.]

That qualification—"with regard to the attacks on the United States"—is crucial. The Bush administration has never claimed Iraq was behind the attacks on September 11. In fact, when that question was put to President Bush by reporters from *Newsweek* six weeks before the Iraq war, his answer was direct: "I cannot make that claim."

What the Bush administration did say—and what so many reporters seem to have trouble understanding—is that Iraq and al Qaeda had a relationship that, by its very existence, posed a potential threat to the United States. (According to the Senate Intelligence Committee report released on July 9, the CIA counterterrorism center concurred: "Any indication of a relationship between these two hostile elements could carry great dangers to the United States.")

Was it a "collaborative relationship"? Former CIA director George Tenet testified on several occasions that intelligence from "sources of varying reliability" indicated that Iraq provided safe haven and training to al Qaeda. If he's right, that's collaboration. But it's not just George Tenet. An internal Iraqi intelligence document recovered in postwar Iraq referred to Iraq-al Qaeda ties as a "relationship." The *New York Times* first disclosed the existence of that document—authenticated by several U.S. government intelligence units—one week after the 9/11 Commission's staff statement. The document states that "cooperation between the two organizations should be allowed to develop freely through discussion and agreement" and that when bin Laden was expelled from Sudan in 1996, Iraqi intelligence sought "other channels through which to handle the relationship."

Let us be clear: Neither we nor the Bush administration ever suggested that Saddam Hussein directed or had foreknowledge of the 9/11 plot. The CIA assessment that al Qaeda was capable of conducting those attacks without the active assistance of a state sponsor is quite persuasive. Still, there are two Iraq-related issues that deserve further explanation from the 9/11 Commission: hijacker Mohammed Atta's alleged meetings with Iraqi intelligence in Prague, and the al Qaeda-related activities of Iraqi Ahmed Hikmat Shakir.

Staff Statement 16, released last month, expressed doubts that Mohammed Atta met with an Iraqi intelligence official in Prague in April 2001. Those doubts may be reasonable, but the evidence presented in that statement is hardly conclusive—interviews with intelligence officials (no details of the interviews are provided) and cell phone records that may or may not place Atta in the United States. Remarkably, the Staff Statement made no mention

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of Atta's unusual trips to Prague in the spring of 2000, trips he made en route to the United States. An unclassified CIA document released last week by Senator Carl Levin reports that "according to detainee reporting [Atta] departed to the United States from Prague because he thought a non-E.U. member country would be less likely to keep meticulous travel data." Perhaps. But Atta probably created a more elaborate paper trail, including a German visa, by going out of his way to travel from Germany to Prague twice in a matter of days before coming to the United States. (And if Atta were concerned about traveling to E.U. countries, he apparently got over that by July, when he made a round-trip flight from the United States to Spain.) We look forward to a more comprehensive treatment of this in the Commission's final report this week.

The other potential Iraqi connection to September 11 concerns Ahmed Hikmat Shakir. According to the Senate Intelligence Committee's July 9 report, Shakir is an Iraqi national

> who facilitated the travel of one of the September 11 hijackers to Malaysia in January 2000. [Redacted.] A foreign government service reported that Shakir worked for four months as an airport facilitator in Kuala Lumpur at the end of 1999 and beginning of 2000. Shakir claimed he got this job through Ra'ad al-Mudaris, an Iraqi embassy employee. [Redacted.] Another source claimed that al-Mudaris was a former IIS [Iraqi intelligence] officer. The CIA judged in *Iraqi Support for Terrorism*, however, that al-Mudaris' [redacted] that the circumstances surrounding the hiring of Shakir for this position did not suggest it was done on behalf of the IIS.

This chronology alone is stunning: A man who received his job through a contact at the Iraqi embassy—a former intelligence officer by one reckoning—facilitates the arrival of a September 11 hijacker for one of the key planning meetings before those attacks.

And there is more to the story, as previously reported in these pages by Stephen F. Hayes. According to several government sources familiar with the intelligence, Shakir's schedule was controlled by the Iraqi embassy contact. Shakir was detained twice after the September 11 attacks, first in Qatar—where authorities found contact information for several high-ranking al Qaeda terrorists in his possession—and later in Jordan. Saddam Hussein's government demanded Shakir's release.

Was the CIA's assessment in *Iraqi Support for Terrorism* the right one? It may be that the "circumstances surrounding the hiring of Shakir for this position did not suggest it was done on behalf of the IIS." What were those circumstances? Hayes has reported that analysts at the CIA were skeptical of an Iraqi intelligence connection because al-Mudaris, Shakir's embassy contact, was a relatively low-ranking embassy official, and the CIA believed this not to be the usual profile of an Iraqi intelligence operative working under diplomatic cover. But how much weight should one give this assumption by the CIA?

In any case, the CIA itself—according to the Senate Intelligence Committee report—has prudently shown "reluctance to draw a conclusion with regard to Shakir." The 9/11 Commission, as yet, has also not drawn any conclusions regarding Shakir. That's because, other than one brief public allusion by Commissioner John Lehman, the 9/11 Commission has never mentioned Shakir. Certainly that oversight deserves to be remedied in its final report. What is the explanation for this apparent connection between Iraqi intelligence and a 9/11 planning meeting?

—*William Kristol*

If you read us weekly, don't miss us daily.
www.weeklystandard.com
Where you can read both THE WEEKLY STANDARD and the Daily Standard

the weekly Standard
Subscribe • The Weekly Standard • The Daily Standard • Info • Search • Subscribers Only

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Missing Link

What the Senate report really says about Iraq and al Qaeda. BY STEPHEN F. HAYES

IN THE FLOOD OF COMMENT that greeted the Senate Intelligence Committee's 511-page report on pre-Iraq war intelligence, no one remarked upon this sentence from the document about the Iraq-al Qaeda connection: "Any indication of a relationship between these two hostile elements could carry great dangers to the United States."

That is the reason the CIA's Counterterrorism Center gave for its decision to provide an "aggressive" analysis of Saddam Hussein's links to al Qaeda. The statement may seem self-evident—yet it is surprising nonetheless, coming as it does in a report said by the *Washington Post* to "shred" the Bush administration's rationales for the war.

The *Post*, like others, prominently featured the committee's Conclusion 93: "The Central Intelligence Agency reasonably assessed that there were likely several instances of contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda throughout the 1990s, but that these contacts did not add up to an established formal relationship."

No *established formal relationship*. That assessment, of course, hardly precludes cooperation—or "linkage" or "ties" or a "connection," though Al Gore, Bill Clinton, and John Edwards denied in recent days that these existed between al Qaeda and Iraq, and news reports echoed the Democrats.

With the absence of large stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, a new conventional wisdom has emerged. Saddam Hussein was contained, in his box. The Iraqi Intelligence Service, active in crushing internal dissent, was essentially inactive outside Iraq's borders. The bottom line: Saddam Hussein's Iraq was not a threat.

The text of the Senate report tells a very different story. The panel based much of its analysis on a CIA product published in January 2003 called *Iraqi Support for Terrorism*—the most restrained of five CIA reports on Iraq and terror. The findings will surprise Americans who have relied for their information about the Iraqi threat on the establishment news media.

> Iraq continues to be a safehaven, transit point, or operational node for groups and individuals who direct violence against the United States, Israel, and other allies. Iraq has a long history of supporting terrorism. During the last four decades, it has altered its targets to reflect changing priorities and goals. It continues to harbor and sustain a number of smaller anti-Israel terrorist groups and to actively encourage violence against Israel. Regarding the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship, reporting from sources of varying credibility points to a number of contacts, incidents of training, and discussions of Iraqi safehaven for Osama bin Laden and his organization dating from the early 1990s.

The Senate report summarized the findings on Iraqi Intelligence support for terrorism this way: "The CIA provided 78 reports, from multiple sources, [redacted] documenting instances in which the Iraqi regime either trained operatives for attacks or dispatched them to carry out attacks. . . . Iraq continued to participate in terrorist attacks throughout the 1990s." No wonder the Clinton administration cited Iraqi support for terrorism as one of the main reasons that Saddam Hussein's regime posed a threat to the United States.

Again, from the Senate report:

> From 1996 to 2003, the IIS [Iraqi Intelligence Service] focused its terrorist activities on western interests, particularly against the U.S. and Israel. The CIA summarized nearly 50 intelligence reports as examples, using language directly from the intelligence reports. Ten intelligence reports, [redacted] from multiple sources, indicated IIS "casing" operations against Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in Prague began in 1998 and continued into early 2003. The CIA assessed, based on the Prague casings and a variety of other reporting, that throughout 2002, the IIS was becoming increasingly aggressive in planning attacks against U.S. interests. The CIA provided eight reports to support this assessment.

For seven years, then, Iraq "focused its terrorist activities on western interests" including those of the United States. And throughout 2002, at a time when one might expect the Iraqis to lower their terrorist profile so as to avoid becoming the next target in the war on terror, Iraqi Intelligence "was becoming increasingly aggressive in planning attacks against U.S. interests."

The Senate report goes on to detail Iraqi support and funding for a variety of anti-Israel groups. According to one report from a foreign government service, the Iraqis provided "approximately $10 million to $15 million" to the families of suicide bombers. In another surprising detail, the report indicates that Iraq even reached out to Hezbollah, a terrorist organization with close ties to Iran, the regime's chief regional enemy. Hezbollah is said to have rejected the Iraqi overtures.

One of the more striking aspects of the 46-page section of the Senate report on "Iraq's Links to Terrorism" is the sparseness of the intelligence collection on the subject, particularly on Iraq's relationship with al Qaeda. For that reason, according to the Senate report, "the CIA was unable to make conclusive assessments in *Iraqi Support for Terrorism* regarding

Stephen F. Hayes is a staff writer at THE WEEKLY STANDARD *and the author of* The Connection.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Iraq's relationship with al Qaeda."

What the CIA did find, however, was troubling. Then CIA director George Tenet testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee about the relationship in a closed session on September 17, 2002.

> There is evidence that Iraq provided al Qaeda with various kinds of training—combat, bomb-making and [chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear] CBRN. Although Saddam did not endorse al Qaeda's overall agenda and was suspicious of Islamist movements in general, he was apparently not averse, under certain circumstances, to enhancing bin Laden's operational capabilities. As with much of the information on the overall relationship, details on training are [redacted] from sources of varying reliability.

So Saddam was open to enhancing bin Laden's operational capabilities. There is evidence he may have done so. That seems significant. But that datum has apparently escaped the notice of every major journalist covering this story.

According to an earlier, more specific version of the CIA's *Iraqi Support for Terrorism*, "the general pattern that emerges is one of al Qaeda's enduring interest in acquiring chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) expertise from Iraq." The Senate reports add to this understanding, citing "twelve reports received [redacted] from sources the CIA described as having varying reliability" that pointed to "Iraq or Iraqi national involvement in al Qaeda's CBW [chemical/biological weapons] efforts." The reports were not conclusive—some of them were based on hearsay, and in other cases connections to the Iraqi regime could not be confirmed. They were troubling nonetheless.

The Senate committee also reports that the CIA's counterterrorism center cited four "intelligence reports mentioning Saddam Hussein's standing offer of safehaven to Osama bin Laden." The Senate report also indicates that the Iraqi regime "certainly" had knowledge that Abu Musab al Zarqawi—described in *Iraqi Support for Terrorism* as a "senior al Qaeda terrorist planner"—was operating in Baghdad and Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq.

We are left, then, with the following scenario. Before the Iraq war, the U.S. intelligence community reported that from 1996 to 2003 the Iraqi Intelligence service had focused its terrorist activity on Western interests, including the United States; "throughout 2002, the IIS was becoming increasingly aggressive in planning attacks against U.S. interests"; Saddam Hussein was open "to enhancing bin Laden's operational capability" and may have provided training to al Qaeda; bin Laden had made direct and specific requests for Iraqi assistance; al Qaeda had demonstrated an "enduring interest" in WMD expertise from Iraq; the Iraqi regime "certainly" knew that al Qaeda agents were operating in Baghdad and northern Iraq; and Saddam Hussein had made a "standing offer" to Osama bin Laden for safe haven in Iraq.

That this information comes from a collection operation deemed "inadequate" suggests that it represents just a fraction of the available knowledge of the Iraqi threat. To be sure, some of that additional information might suggest that Iraq was not the threat the Senate report indicates. Who would want to take that chance?

Certainly not John Edwards, who used the first anniversary of the September 11 attacks to call for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. "The terrorist threat against America is all too clear. Thousands of terrorist operatives around the world would pay anything to get their hands on Saddam's arsenal, and there is every reason to believe that Saddam would turn his weapons over to these terrorists. No one can doubt that if the terrorists of September 11 had had weapons of mass destruction, they would have used them. On September 12, 2002, we can hardly ignore the terrorist threat and serious danger that Saddam would allow his arsenal to be used in aid of terror."

John Kerry, too, invoked the September 11 attacks to warn about the threat from Iraq. "The events of September 11 created a new understanding of the terrorist threat and the degree to which every nation is vulnerable," he said in his October 9, 2002, floor speech explaining his vote to authorize the Iraq war.

Imagine for a moment that we had not gone to war in Iraq in March 2003. And that Washington, D.C., had been attacked using five pounds of Iraqi anthrax—a development that William Cohen, secretary of defense under Bill Clinton, said would "destroy at least half the population" of the city. Imagine, too, that Iraq had supplied the deadly substance to al Qaeda terrorists, the kind of collaboration a 1999 Congressional Research Service study called "likely" if Saddam were to attempt a strike inside the United States. That report, some readers may recall, also presented a scenario eerily similar to the September 11 attacks. Democrats and journalists used the report to suggest the Bush administration had done too little to prevent those attacks.

Rather than speeches about a needless war to counter an exaggerated threat, we would almost certainly be hearing something like this: *This administration had 12 separate reports that Iraq had provided training in chemical and biological weapons to al Qaeda. Yet it refused to act. This administration knew of numerous high-level meetings between Iraqi Intelligence and Osama bin Laden and his top deputies. Yet it refused to act. This administration had been told by the CIA that Iraqi Intelligence had become increasingly aggressive throughout 2002 in targeting U.S. interests. Yet it refused to act. This administration knew that Saddam Hussein had made Osama bin Laden a standing offer of safe haven. Yet it refused to act.*

The Bush administration—with the support of John Edwards and John Kerry—did act. And despite the misreporting from the mainstream media and the criticism from these onetime war proponents, "Iraqi support for terrorism" as enumerated in the Senate Intelligence Committee report make it clear that the war was both necessary and justified. ♦

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Less Central, More Intelligent?

How not to reform the CIA.

BY GARY SCHMITT

WHEN THE SENATE Intelligence Committee released its report on prewar assessments of Iraq's WMD programs and Iraq's ties to terrorism, it generated a host of front-page stories, news commentaries, and political debate—as it should have. Even in its heavily redacted form, the report is well worth reading, providing a rare and detailed depiction of a traditionally very closed intelligence bureaucracy. But the report is also worth reading because not all of its findings have been adequately reported or fully understood. What follow are four nuggets that analysts and the media have largely missed.

• First, the core conclusion of the report with respect to the intelligence community's assessment of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs is *not* that those assessments were unreasonable. (The intelligence community, or IC, comprises the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.)



Peter Steiner

At the time the IC drafted and coordinated the NIE [National Intelligence Estimate] on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in September 2002, most of what the intelligence analysts actually "knew" about Iraq's weapons programs pre-dated the 1991 Gulf War, leaving them with very little knowledge about the current state of those programs. Analysts knew that Iraq had active nuclear, chemical, biological, and delivery programs before 1991, and had previously lied to, and was still not forthcoming with, U.N. inspectors about those programs. The analysts also knew that the United Nations was not satisfied with Iraq's efforts to account for its destruction of all its pre-Gulf War weapons, precursors, and equipment. Additionally, the analysts knew that Iraq was trying to import dual-use materials and equipment and had rebuilt or was continuing to use facilities that had been associated with Iraq's pre-Gulf War weapons programs, and knew that WMD were likely within Iraq's technological capabilities.

As the report goes on to state, based on the above, the intelligence community made a "reasonable assessment" that "Iraq had retained its pre-Gulf War weapons and that Iraq was using dual-use materials and facilities to manufacture weapons." The mistake analysts made, then, was suggesting these were known facts, not reasoned inferences.

But this raises an important question: What if the intelligence community had presented its conclusions about Iraq's weapons programs as inferences and not facts? Would Congress have voted differently about going to war? The answer is almost certainly no. Given Saddam's history, the slow but inevitable collapse of the sanctions regime against Iraq, and the recalibration after 9/11 of the security problems we faced, Congress would have seen a no vote as a high-stakes gamble.

Gary Schmitt is executive director of the Project for the New American Century and former executive director of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The CIA can be faulted—as the report argues—for not having made more of an effort to develop first-hand human intelligence on what Iraq was up to. But no one should kid himself: Recruiting the kinds and number of sources that would have led the intelligence community to rethink its views was always a long shot. In the real world, unless we are attacked directly, the decision to go to war is almost always a judgment call—the kind we elect congressmen to make.

• Second, the report concludes that the Central Intelligence Agency was on the mark about the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship: some contacts, yes; more than that, probably not. Yet, as the report itself states, "Despite four decades of intelligence reporting on Iraq, there was little useful intelligence collected that helped analysts determine the Iraqi regime's possible links to al Qaeda." Indeed, the CIA "did not have a focused human intelligence collection strategy targeting Iraq's links to terrorism until 2002. The CIA had no [redacted] sources on the ground in Iraq reporting specifically on terrorism."

Sorry, but how does the committee conclude that the Agency got it right on "the connection" when, as they point out, there was no collection of any significance on this key issue? In this instance, the committee has adopted an analytic posture that looks like the very thing they just accused the intelligence community of with respect to Iraq's WMD—dressing up inference and supposition as more fact than not. Given how little attention and assets the CIA dedicated to this issue, what is striking is not how little information there is on the ties between Iraq and al Qaeda, but how much there is—especially when it comes to the possible training of al Qaeda operatives by Iraq in bomb-making and chemical weapons.

• Third, news accounts of the report have duly noted that the committee "did not find any evidence that Administration officials attempted to coerce, influence or pressure analysts to change their judgments related to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities." What has largely gone missing from these accounts is the report's conclusion that "probing questions" on the part of administration officials with respect to the issue of Iraq's ties to terrorism had, as the CIA analysts admitted, "actually improved the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) products."

Contrary to the Washington conventional wisdom of recent months, tough questioning of intelligence analysts by administration officials is not the moral equivalent of the Dresden bombing. Probing questions are likely to make the intelligence product more thoughtful and useful to policymakers. As the committee report pointedly notes:

> While analysts cannot dismiss a threat because at first glance it seems unreasonable or it cannot be corroborated by other credible reporting, policymakers have the ultimate responsibility for making decisions based on this same fragmentary, inconclusive reporting. If policymakers did not respond to analysts' caveated judgments with pointed, probing questions, and did not require them to produce the most complete assessments possible, they would not be doing their jobs.

• Finally, the report concludes that the CIA and its director "abused" their "unique" positions within the intelligence community to the detriment of the intelligence provided senior policymakers. While, by law, the director of central intelligence is supposed to act as the head of both the CIA and the intelligence community as a whole, the committee found that "in many instances he only acted as head of the CIA." Similarly, the CIA's position as the central repository of all-source intelligence and as the agency that directly supports the director in his role as the president's principal intelligence adviser allowed "CIA analysts and officials to provide the agency's intelligence analysis to senior policymakers without having to explain dissenting views or defend their analysis from potential challenges from other Intelligence Community agencies." In short, centralized intelligence, instead of providing the most accurate and objective analysis to policymakers, "actually undermined" that goal.

This is a remarkable finding. Perhaps the most sacred cow in all of American intelligence is the idea that a *central* intelligence agency is an absolute necessity. Now, for the first time since the creation of the modern American defense establishment and the CIA in 1947, a government report has raised—if only implicitly—the question of whether this is true, at least when it comes to analysis.

Originally, there were two dominant reasons for a centralized effort. The first, to solve the so-called Pearl Harbor problem: Unless there were a central agency to analyze all incoming intelligence, the likelihood of being surprised, with all the consequences that portended in the nuclear age, would go way up. In this day of massive databanks and computer networks, this rationale is nowhere near as compelling. Why can't all-source analysis be done by multiple centers or organizations?

The second, and more serious, reason for having a "central" intelligence agency is that it would be free of the biases and constraints associated with connection to a particular part of the government. Only a central intelligence agency supposedly could be independent enough to speak "truth to power." But, as the Senate report makes clear, being independent of a particular department of government is no guarantee that an agency won't develop a bureaucratic interest or stake in some view over time. And certainly, as the history of intelligence "surprises" since 1947 shows, speaking "truth" to power is not something presidents and policymakers should count on from this central intelligence agency. For this reason, "competitive analysis" (that is, the existence of competing centers of intelligence analysis) is a necessary, even if not sufficient, corrective.

Of course, one of the ironies of this

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

report's publication, along with previous and ongoing investigations into the intelligence effort prior to 9/11, is the call by many—including the leadership of the House Intelligence Committee and Brent Scowcroft, head of the president's Intelligence Advisory Board—to reform American intelligence by *increasing* the powers of the director of central intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency. Yet, as anyone reading the Senate's report should conclude, producing high-quality, accurate intelligence is a daunting task. It requires a far better job of collecting intelligence than at present we are doing, and it requires significantly improved analytic efforts. Even then, we shouldn't be surprised that we will be surprised. Our opponents know how to keep secrets and they know how to mislead. The one thing we should not do is make the job of intelligence more difficult by giving even more responsibility to people and institutions that have yet to reform themselves. ♦

The Conservative Case for Cheney

And why he won't be dumped.

BY STEPHEN MOORE & JEFFREY BELL

DUMP DICK CHENEY? It won't happen, and if it did, it would be a terrible idea. The president would be losing his most intelligent and experienced adviser. And conservatives would be losing one of our most consistent and effective champions, at home and abroad.

The 63-year-old Cheney became White House chief of staff to President Gerald Ford 29 years ago. In 1988, when he was 47, he was elected House Minority Whip, only to accept appointment early the following year as Secretary of Defense.

In virtually every one of this remarkable succession of roles, Cheney has been on the right flank of his milieu. As Ford's deputy chief of staff, he was listening to obscure supply-siders like USC professor Arthur Laffer and was one of a minority of Ford advisers who fruitlessly pushed tax-rate reduction. (When Laffer drew his famous curve on the dinner napkin, Cheney, along with chief of staff Donald Rumsfeld, was the audience.)

Stephen Moore is president of the Club for Growth and Jeffrey Bell is a principal of Capital City Partners, a Washington consulting firm.

New from the author of the national bestseller
The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order

Is the melting pot overflowing?

American national identity is being eroded by immigration, bilingualism, multiculturalism, and the "denationalization" of American elites. Now author and eminent political scientist Samuel P. Huntington reaffirms what it means to be American.

"A compelling book on the virtues that make America what it is." —*The Wall Street Journal*

"Poses some of the critical questions facing our nation...[and] tackles these questions with passionate intensity." —*The Washington Post*



SIMON & SCHUSTER
A VIACOM COMPANY
www.simonsays.com

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In the House leadership of the 1980s, Cheney was the most relentless and best-informed advocate of the Reagan military buildup that helped win the Cold War. Under Bush I, he was the only member of the administration's top policy team who quietly disagreed with the decision to end the ground war after 100 hours and thus leave Saddam Hussein in power.

Within this Bush administration, Cheney has been a strong internal advocate for the most radical parts of the supply-side agenda, including the phaseout of the death tax and the two-thirds reduction in the personal income tax on dividends. These have been among the biggest surprises of the last four years, and could never have happened without a president whose own reformist inclinations turned out to be far more radically conservative than even most conservatives thought. But with a secretary of the treasury, Paul O'Neill, who was actively opposed to the tax-cut agenda, economic conservatives are lucky to have had Cheney's credible and forceful internal advocacy of what has proven to be a remarkably ambitious tax-cut agenda.

On the war on terrorism, Cheney has from the beginning favored a forward strategy, putting him in frequent conflict with Secretary of State Colin Powell. Believing the decision to leave Saddam in power in 1991 to have been a fateful mistake, Cheney and his allies moved heaven and earth to make sure the mistake was not repeated. For this, the left and elements of the isolationist right will never forgive him. But try to picture a continuation of the "legalistic" strategy pursued by the previous administration. In those circumstances, would the nation have gone nearly three years without a new attack on our homeland? Would Libya have turned over its weapons secrets? Would Pakistan and perhaps even Saudi Arabia be showing signs of anti-Islamist realignment?

Even apart from 9/11, Bush has been more of a foreign-policy conservative than expected. Conservatives for untold years raged against the obsolete 1972 ABM treaty with the Soviet Union that inhibited missile defense, even though the Soviet Union no longer exists. Bush (with a heads-up to Vladimir Putin) not only abrogated the treaty but ordered deployment (not "study") of U.S. missile defense. How likely would so hawkish an outcome have been in a simple clash of Rumsfeld vs. Powell? Was sophisticated, well-informed former Pentagon chief Cheney the only credible tie-breaker on this issue? We may never know.


Dick Cheney

One of the reasons we may never know is that Cheney is completely loyal to the president, and never leaks self-serving spin on his own role. As in his earlier executive jobs, he is a team player who defends decisions that he may have argued against in the privacy of the White House. In part because he has no intention of running for president, but also because he has always been loyal and self-effacing, he doesn't rush to defend himself even when being demonized by the media or the Democrats.

Given the utter lack of a "P.R." strategy, it is all the more remarkable that a new Gallup poll on Cheney's standing concludes that the relentless media story line of Cheney as a "polarizing" figure who is a "drag" on Bush is a myth. Cheney's negatives have gone up in a time of trial for the administration, but no more than have Bush's. According to Gallup's Frank Newport, Bush and Cheney are equally "polarizing"—or, perhaps more accurately, regarded similarly by a polarized electorate. Bush is rated favorably by 92 percent of Republicans, but unfavorably by 79 percent of Democrats. Cheney is seen favorably by 81 percent of Republicans, and unfavorably by 68 percent of Democrats. The main difference, according to Newport, is due to the fact that 12 percent of voters still say they don't yet know enough about Cheney to have an opinion, while only 2 percent say they don't yet know enough about Bush.

But at a time when at least some voters have heard about Cheney's having a profane exchange with Vermont senator Pat Leahy, could dumping sentiment be up, relative to earlier soundings? Gallup asked a year ago if Cheney should be retained on the ticket, and again last October, and a third time last week. The number has gone from 51 percent (last July) to 53 percent (October) to 59 percent (last week). Cheney is rated very favorably by Republicans (81-12 positive, 70 percent pro-retention), but a majority of independents and even of Democrats now believe he should be retained.

He will be. In the campaign he will argue the conservative case for Bush-Cheney, and his credibility and experience will dwarf that of a Democratic ticket whose combined executive experience comprises Kerry's five years as an assistant prosecutor and two years as lieutenant governor of Massachusetts. In the words of George W. Bush, Cheney "can be president." ♦

Illustration by Drew Friedman

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What Unites Europeans?

Antipathy to the United Europe project.

BY GERARD BAKER

UNDER PRESSURE from insurgents in Iraq, assailed by his Democratic opponent at home for a reckless "unilateralism," struggling to reassure a restive American public that his foreign policy is on the right track, President Bush has turned to an unlikely corner for help this summer—Europe.

In the space of three weeks in June, the president shuttled across the Atlantic on a diplomatic itinerary that read like that of a demented tourist—Rome, Paris, Normandy, Dublin, Istanbul. When he wasn't receiving their hospitality, Bush was treating European leaders to some of his own—at the G-8 Summit in Sea Island, Georgia, or on the fringes of President Reagan's funeral.

Throughout a hectic month, the talk was of hatchets buried, pages turned, old alliances renewed, friendships rekindled. In Paris, he enjoyed what aides said was a fine dinner with his old chum President Jacques Chirac (Bush may not have eaten any crow, but freedom fries were definitely off the menu). At Sea Island and in Istanbul, at the NATO summit, he exchanged warm words with Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (no mention of certain former members of the German cabinet who once likened Bush to Hitler), and in Dublin he expressed his affection and appreciation for the leadership of the European Union (never a discouraging word about the differences between Old and New Europe). If Bush had broken into a few bars of the "Marseillaise" or donned a pair of lederhosen, his message could not have been clearer.

You don't have to be a cynic to believe there is a degree of pragmatism about this newfound fondness for Europe in the West Wing. Getting a U.N. resolution passed on Iraq last month was essential to an orderly transfer of power. Having the Europeans on board was the sine qua non of that project. Demonstrating to the American people that others are willing to take on some of the burden in Iraq is critical to puncturing the Kerry critique that only the Democrats can build an international coalition that will pave the way for an eventual U.S. departure.

And yet beyond these short-term political reasons, there does seem a steadily strengthening conviction, even among some of the most reluctant Atlanticists in this administration, that the United States might need Europe after all. Sure, the pacific old continent is never going to belly up to the bar when there's serious fighting to be done. And those who can produce something meaningful in military terms—the British, mainly, and some martial Eastern Europeans—have stuck with the United States all along, even in Iraq.

But Europe, the quasi-mythical entity, still seems to count to the rest of the world, and even to Americans. It just isn't enough to have the ever-loyal Tony Blair and a bunch of anonymous folk from the Eastern Bloc pulling for you if France and Germany, and through them the institutions of the European Union and NATO, are standing resentfully, contemptuously aside. If only we could get a united Europe, as we did in the Cold War, on our side, surely—Americans seem to be saying—we could achieve much more of what we want in the world.

You could be forgiven for thinking, with Americans now evidently less confident about their ability to remake the world, with Kerry and Bush apparently in a desperate competition to prove who is the more multilateralist and Euro-friendly, that this might be Europe's hour.

The once derided Old Europeans, it seems, have been vindicated and are in the intellectual and geopolitical ascendant. The French, Germans, Belgians, and others have, you would think, won the battle for the future of Europe. In Spain, José María Aznar, the conservative prime minister, was ousted in March; Tony Blair and Silvio Berlusconi, Bush's other main European backers, are hanging by a thread.

With public opinion, fueled by the distortions of Michael Moore and the connivance of a complaisant media, hardening against the United States and its aims and ambitions in the Middle East, it would be easy to imagine Europeans uniting around the Franco-German leadership, with its lofty ambition to build Europe as a counterweight to American power in the world.

And yet, last month, even as Bush was making nice with European leaders, the voters on the old continent were giving a rather different verdict on them.

In the European parliamentary elections in early June, Chancellor Schröder's Social Democrats in Germany suffered humiliation at the polls at the hands of their conservative opponents. In France, Chirac's Gaullists were soundly beaten by a combination of socialists and nationalists. Even in plucky little Belgium, the spiritual home of Europe's dreamers, the ruling party, which had fervently backed the Franco-German axis, got trounced.

It would be nice to think European voters had had a change of heart

Gerard Baker is U.S. editor of the Times *of London and a contributing editor to* THE WEEKLY STANDARD.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

about Iraq, but sadly that was not behind the rout of the Old Europeans. In Britain, too, and in much of Eastern Europe, ruling parties got kicked.

Try as they might to blame a continent-wide set of special factors for the startling setbacks, there was one clear explanation for the rejection—and one that has even bigger implications for transatlantic relations than Iraq.

Europe's voters were reacting angrily, with a unified voice rarely seen in European politics, against the ambitious plans of the continent's elite to accelerate and deepen a process of political integration that has, as its ultimate ambition, the creation of a superstate to rival the United States.

Not only was support for governing parties substantially down, support for parties that have been opposed to European integration was up sharply. In Britain, the U.K. Independence party, which favors outright withdrawal from the E.U., got more than 16 percent of the vote, placing it third behind the already Euroskeptic conservatives and Labour. Euroskeptic (or Euro-realist, as they prefer to be called) parties did well in France, Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands, too.

More striking still was the result in Eastern Europe. Having been admitted to the E.U. just a month earlier, voters in eight former Communist states voted against the E.U. in large numbers. In the Czech Republic, Hungary, and the Baltic states, Euro-realist parties fared well. And across Europe, in another sign of disenchantment and disdain for the European project, turnout was pitiful.

European voters—especially in the New Europe, which is alive and well, it should be noted—have good reason to react against the E.U.; there is a widespread view reflected in polls that it is out of touch, corrupt, and bureaucratic. Its economic policies stifle enterprise with complex regulations; its leading economies espouse high taxes and expensive welfare states even as the population ages rapidly. Above all, its Franco-German leadership still dreams of creating what amounts to a single, multination state, with its own foreign policy, that will make the E.U. much more effective at blocking U.S. policies.

To all this, most of Europe's voters said last month, politely, roughly what Dick Cheney said to Democratic senator Pat Leahy on the floor of the U.S. Senate.

And yet, in what must rank as another Marie Antoinette moment in Europe's history, the continent's political leaders simply ignored the popular verdict. A week after the historic elections, the E.U. leaders agreed on a treaty containing a new "constitution," the first ever for the E.U.

If ratified, this 400-page document would accelerate and deepen European integration. Over the objection of Britain to some of the more extreme elements, it would, in the fields of economics, social policy, justice and criminal law, and even foreign and security policy, establish broad, overarching European, as opposed to national, competence.

In other words, as voters were rejecting the vainglorious ambitions of Europe's elite to create a federal state, the leaders themselves were finalizing an ever more grandiose plan.

Happily, that is not the end of the story. The voters will get another chance. The treaty now has to be ratified by all 25 member states. Giving in reluctantly to enormous pressure to consult the public, at least eight countries—including Britain and France—will submit the constitution to a referendum.

In the interest of sane and safe representative democracy, it is fervently to be wished that the voters of Europe reject the plan. Under the treaty, if just one country fails to ratify it, the agreement becomes null. But another more likely and intriguing possibility is now in prospect.

Core European countries, most of whom, such as Germany, are not submitting the constitution to a vote in any case, will give their approval. France, a country with a long record of consulting its often truculent population, may prove trickier. But voters in the referendum there will come under serious pressure from all the mainstream parties to approve the treaty.

In Britain, too, Tony Blair will campaign hard for a Yes vote, but it looks a tall order. Opinion polls show more than two thirds of voters likely to reject the constitution.

If Britain rejects the treaty, it is possible the whole project will be scrapped. But more likely is an outcome hinted at in the constitution itself, which would enable those countries that want it to go ahead with closer integration in the political, economic, and social spheres. Under this "enhanced cooperation," in Euro-jargon, the core countries might accelerate the process by which they become something resembling a single state.

But other countries, like Britain, are likely to want to hold back, valuing their national independence, but also their economic systems and their foreign policies.

In a decade or so, then, it is possible to imagine not one Europe but two. A core group of countries would be characterized by aging and sclerotic economies, overregulated and overtaxed, as well as by exaggerated global ambitions to rival the United States as a superpower. An outer eurozone might be made up of Britain, Scandinavia (two of whose members have already rejected the euro), and several of the most dynamic former Communist countries, plus Turkey (which, unless French opposition prevents it again, will begin the process of joining the E.U. later this year).

These latter nations are likely to be strongly Atlanticist in outlook, promoting free markets and open trade and being broadly supportive of American global leadership—and, with Turkey on board, perhaps also offering a vital link to the Islamic world, promoting democracy and economic freedom in the Middle East, in line with the long-run strategic objectives of the United States.

Now that is a Europe America could really do business with. ♦

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Moral Low Ground

Judges from a variety of unsavory regimes complain about Israel's fence. BY MAX BOOT

THE WORLD COURT'S ruling that the West Bank barrier is illegal and must be torn down has been greeted in Israel with a giant shrug of the shoulders. The court's opinion is only "advisory," and any attempt by the United Nations to enforce it is sure to be vetoed by the United States. The barrier—which the court tendentiously referred to as "the wall" (most of it is actually a chain-link fence)—will continue to go up. Yet the ruling is not without significance, insofar as it contributes to the growing impression around the world that, as the London *Independent* put it, "the Palestinians have the moral high ground."

They might lose some of that high ground if anyone actually bothered to examine the World Court a little more closely. The International Court of Justice, to give this august body its formal name, is made up of 15 judges selected through the usual horse-trading at the United Nations. Fourteen of them voted against Israel; the one dissenting voice belonged, no surprise, to the one American judge. Who are these 14 pillars of moral rectitude who pronounce such damning judgment on the only full-fledged democracy in the entire Middle East?

The court president, Shi Jiuyong, hails from China, one of the more dictatorial regimes in the world. Though China has been implementing free-market reforms, it continues to deny basic political and religious rights, with large numbers of dissidents held in prisons and labor camps for "crimes" such as advocating free elections or practicing the Falun Gong religion. Israel, needless to say, has complete freedom of speech and religion. And, while Israel wants to annex only a small sliver of the West Bank, China has grabbed all of Tibet. But, with its veto power at the U.N. Security Council, Beijing is able to shield itself from well-deserved international obloquy.

Max Boot, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, is a contributing editor to THE WEEKLY STANDARD *and a columnist for the* Los Angeles Times.



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The vice president of the court is Raymond Ranjeva, from Madagascar, which has a better human-rights record than China but is still rated by Freedom House as only "partly free." Since a long period of rule by a military junta ended in 1991, Madagascar has held several elections characterized by what international observers call "irregularities." At least Madagascar is moving in the right direction. Venezuela and Russia, two other countries represented on the court, have been sliding into authoritarianism. The Russian government has practiced a scorched-earth policy in Chechnya that is far more cruel than anything Israel has ever done in the West Bank or Gaza Strip. Yet, like Beijing, Moscow has no fear of censure from the U.N., where it wields veto power.

Sierra Leone, also represented on the court, has suffered from government that, far from being overly repressive, was too weak to stop a decade-long civil war. Until the intervention of British troops in 2000, Sierra Leone had turned into a Lord of the Flies realm where child soldiers raped, maimed, and killed with impunity. Hardly the background, one would think, for lecturing others on how to deal with political violence.

Then there are the two Arab judges, one from Egypt, the other from Jordan. Neither country is remotely as free as Israel. Where is the international condemnation of the Egyptian prison system, in which tens of thousands of suspected Islamist sympathizers have been subjected to torture or summary execution?

There are, to be sure, some World Court judges who come from countries as democratic as Israel. Five of them hail from the European Union: Britain, France, the Netherlands, Germany, Slovakia. To its credit, the E.U. asked the court not to accept this case because "it will not help the efforts of the two parties to re-launch a political dialogue." But judges aren't bound by their countries' positions, and all of the E.U. judges voted against Israel.

The long record of European atrocities against the Jews, from the Inquisition to the Holocaust, might give pause to any European magistrate ruling against measures deemed vital by the Jewish homeland for its self-defense. Nor has anti-Semitism been banished from present-day Europe. As the E.U. itself has documented, the number of anti-Semitic incidents in recent years has reached a post-World War II high. Fire-bombings of synagogues, desecrations of Jewish cemeteries, assaults on men wearing yarmulkes—all now seem shockingly commonplace, especially in France, the country with the largest Jewish population. Far from dispelling the climate of hatred that gives rise to such incidents, the World Court adds to it by conveying the impression that Israel is a rogue state.

It hardly matters to world opinion that the trial was a joke, with Israel refusing to dignify the proceedings by presenting a defense. That the judges received a decidedly one-sided view of this complicated dispute did not deter them from issuing a strongly worded condemnation of the accused. Their opinion assumes that all of the West Bank is illegally occupied territory, whereas U.N. Resolution 242, adopted in 1967, makes clear that Israel's borders must be established as part of "a peaceful and accepted settlement" between the parties. Reading the lengthy opinion, one can easily get the impression that Israel is building the fence to indulge some whim. There is almost no mention of terrorism, much less of the fact that, since September 2000, more than 1,000 Israeli men, women, and children have been murdered by terrorists from the West Bank. As American judge Thomas Buergenthal wrote in his dissent, "The nature of these cross-Green Line attacks and their impact on Israel and its population are never really seriously examined by the Court."

Though still not complete—about 120 miles out of a planned 437 miles has been built—the fence is already credited by Israeli officials with reducing attacks by 90 percent. A suicide bombing on July 11 that killed one woman was the first in nearly four months—"the longest such stretch since the current round of fighting began," the *New York Times* noted. And when fewer Israelis die, that means fewer Palestinians die, too, since Israel is not forced to stage retaliatory strikes.

Israeli actions are hardly above criticism. There are legitimate questions to be raised about the route of the security fence. Israel's High Court of Justice recently held that 20 miles of the planned barrier must be moved to lessen the hardship on the Palestinian population. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon is complying with this decree. Can anyone imagine a leader of Russia or China or Egypt taking orders from an independent tribunal on such an important matter of state? Yet, for not bowing before a kangaroo court in The Hague, Israel is now to be branded an international outlaw. That says more about Israel's critics than about Israel itself. ♦



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Our Man in Baghdad

The unsung achievements of Paul Bremer

By Fred Barnes

When L. Paul Bremer, fresh from stepping down as American regent in Iraq, visited the White House on June 30, he was greeted by President Bush with a bear hug. Half-jokingly, Bush insisted a White House photographer take a picture of them and drew attention to the signature soft leather boots Bremer wears with a coat, tie, dress shirt, and cufflinks. As the two walked outside from the Oval Office to the Old Executive Office Building, Bush spotted press photographers and immediately threw his arm around Bremer in a gesture of public support. Later that day, Bremer joined the president for a workout in the presidential gym, just as he had last November during an earlier visit to the White House.

Bremer, 62, has many critics, including a few in the Bush administration, but the president isn't among them. Nor should he be, for Bremer is the man who saved Iraq as a single country with a democratic future. True, a lot has gone wrong in postwar Iraq, some of it during Bremer's tenure as administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority from mid-May 2003 to last June 28. But the big things went right, thanks to a handful of Bremer's decisions and his political skill. In Iraq, the center held. The country didn't fracture into three separate rump states, Kurdish, Sunni, and Shia. Neither civil war nor warlordism broke out (though terrorism did). Mass killings of former officials and collaborators with Saddam Hussein's regime never occurred, unlike the bloody reprisals in France and Italy after World War II.

With Bremer's behind-the-scenes assistance, a strong national leader finally stepped forward in Iraq, Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. While Allawi may be no Konrad Adenauer or Nelson Mandela, he is the most clear-eyed and strong-willed politician to emerge from the crowd of ambitious exiles on the now-defunct Iraqi Governing Council. So, absent Bremer, the deluge? Not quite. But it's fair to say that without Bremer, Iraq would be worse off today, far more divided along poisonous ethnic and religious lines. Its prospects for muddling through, for becoming a reasonably stable, mostly democratic country, would be dimmer.

National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice says Iraq would not have been in a position to accept sovereignty last month without Bremer. Iraq as a single national entity "was nurtured" successfully by Bremer, she says. Bremer believes Iraq's chances now of becoming a viable country are roughly three to one. That may be optimistic. But for sure, the odds would be worse had Bremer not served in Iraq.

Bremer achieved a number of smaller successes. The new Iraqi currency the CPA created was instantly accepted. Schools, hospitals, and universities are back in operation all over Iraq. Despite infrastructure in Iraq that's ancient and crumbling, the output of electric power is now greater than it was under Saddam—and distributed more fairly. (Still, it hasn't reached the goal Bremer had set.) The production of oil, Iraq's chief export, is back to prewar levels and rising. Hundreds of thousands of automobiles and a massive amount of consumer goods are now in the hands of average Iraqis. Fly over Iraqi cities, suburbs, or rural areas in a helicopter, and you'll find practically every home has a TV satellite dish. Under Saddam, dishes were banned.

The problems Bremer leaves behind are well known, the most crippling being security. Terrorist attacks and intimidation of Iraqis are everyday occurrences. Before the war, Saddam emptied his jails. The result: Crime is rampant. The violence has had an enormously harmful impact on the country, preventing work on modernizing the infrastructure from proceeding on schedule and scaring away foreign investors who might otherwise be attracted by Iraq's low taxes and educated work force. Without a drastic improvement in the security situation, political stability and economic growth won't be achieved, and Iraq will be a failed state.

Bremer bears part of the blame for the security envi-

Fred Barnes is executive editor of The Weekly Standard.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ronment, but only a small part. The fault lies mostly with what happened during the three-week invasion in 2003. The war never reached the Sunni Triangle, home of Baathists with privileged status under Saddam and now a sanctuary for foreign jihadists. Two Republican Guard divisions there never faced American fire, and the troops disbanded with their weapons. Turkey bears some responsibility. The U.S. 4th Infantry Division was supposed to drive southward from Turkey and subdue much of the Sunni Triangle. But Turkey balked, the 4th never came south, and the stronghold of support for Saddam was spared.

In hindsight, Bremer erred in endorsing the withdrawal this spring of American Marines from Falluja, the largest city in the Sunni Triangle, as they were on the verge of defeating the antidemocratic forces. Instead, the so-called Iraqi Brigade of ex-members of Saddam's army was given the task. Why? Because Bremer and administration officials in Washington feared a national uprising would be ignited by the killing of too many civilians in Falluja. The Iraqi Brigade has arrested no one and seized no weapons. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld privately refers to Falluja as a "failed" experiment. Indeed, it is. The city is now the base from which terrorists launch attacks throughout Iraq, the same function Afghanistan provided for al Qaeda when the Taliban was in charge.

Most of the criticism of Bremer, however, cancels itself out. The *Wall Street Journal* described him as "autocratic," while others faulted him for conceding too much power. In a single *Washington Post* article last month, Bremer was said to have *both* devoted too much time to free-market economic reform and not enough time to removing government obstacles to a thriving market. He's been zinged for focusing on long-range solutions, but also for micromanaging day-to-day work. He's accused of having given both too much and too little authority to the Iraqi Governing Council. Most of the criticism is bogus. So is the charge that Bremer is to blame for the unpopularity of the occupation of Iraq. Military occupations are always unpopular with the occupied.

To assess Bremer's performance, consider two things. First, recall conditions in Iraq when he arrived in Baghdad two months after Saddam was toppled. Iraq was in a state of near anarchy. Government facilities from hospitals to military installations had been looted down to the floor tiles and electrical wiring. Saddam and his sons were at large. There weren't enough American soldiers to secure all of Iraq or its borders. No Iraqi governing body had been established, and ministries were not functioning. The relationship of Bremer's predecessor, Jay Garner, with potential Iraqi leaders consisted of a few meetings with five exiles. Garner had no control over anything. The economy was in shambles. Serious trouble in Falluja had erupted after a dozen civilians were killed by American troops.

Second, consider the enormity of the task Bremer undertook. Given the violence and the sullen lack of cooperation by Iraqis, Bremer's job was tougher than that of General Douglas MacArthur in Japan or John J. McCloy in Germany after World War II. For starters, Bremer had to build a new government, an Iraqi army, a functioning police force, an economy, a banking system, a network of utilities, and a political community that promotes compromise. He needed to forge a "new Iraq" as he calls it, different in every way from the old. And he had to keep Kurds, Sunnis, and Shia, who historically have not gotten along, at peace with one another in a country whose borders had been arbitrarily drawn by Europeans after World War I. Nothing on this scale had ever been tried before.

Bremer's greatest asset was his political dexterity. He managed to please, satisfy, and get the cooperation of nearly all the significant players in Iraq with his guiding principle of "strategic clarity and tactical flexibility." He recognized the importance of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the respected Shia leader, and acceded to his wishes at critical moments. He lined up the two Kurdish leaders, Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, as allies. He cleverly recruited United Nations envoy Lakhdar Brahimi to bestow legitimacy on Allawi's interim government. He persuaded the president and Congress, which had planned to appropriate nothing for Iraqi reconstruction, to allocate an astonishing $18.4 billion.

Bremer's two most controversial decisions—de-Baathification and disbanding the army—were his most consequential. Without them, Iraq was all but certain to fly apart with little chance of becoming even a faintly unified country. Without de-Baathification in particular, Sistani and most if not all of the Shia community—62 percent of the Iraqi population—would have rejected the occupation and a new Iraqi government. The Baathists under Saddam had persecuted the Shia mercilessly for decades. Without officially dissolving Saddam's army, most of which had already disbanded on its own, the Kurds would not have been on board. They held the Iraqi army responsible for killing hundreds of thousands of Kurds.

The argument against de-Baathification is that it deprived postwar Iraq of government officials with critically needed expertise. It did, but it was a price worth paying. Barred from government were the top three layers of the Baathist party and the top four layers in government ministries under Saddam. These amounted to 15,000 to 20,000 people out of two million party members.

Imagine how the new government would look to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Iraqis with many of the same senior directors in charge of the ministries. It would appear that nothing had changed. For decades, college professors in Iraq had been kept from attending academic conferences outside the country. Their applications were nixed by the senior education minister. What if that minister were still in office? What would professors think? They would think nothing had changed and they might be right. Thus, de-Baathification was essential on many levels.

To utilize the Iraqi army to restore order immediately, Bremer would have had to reconstitute parts of it without fully vetting the officers, many of them Sunnis loyal to Saddam. Yes, some became insurgents, but they would have anyway, despite a payment of $80 to $120 a month to former soldiers. Bremer quickly established a careful system for allowing individual soldiers to join the new army. As a result, 100 percent of the officers and NCOs in the post-Saddam army and more than 70 percent of the soldiers are veterans of the old army.

In a June 29 editorial, the *Wall Street Journal* said this: "Mr. Bremer behaved as if he had all the time in the world to stand up Iraqi forces and rebuffed offers from Kurdish, Shiite, and Iraqi National Congress parties to supply loyal anti-Baathist fighters." Bremer had good reason to reject these offers. Accepting them would not have created a national army, which Iraq needs, but a collection of private armies that were anti-Baathist but loyal only to their ethnic or political group. This would have promoted warlordism and impeded the emergence of a united Iraq.



Reuters / Landov / Bullit Marquez

Bremer and his boots

The strategic goal was, as Bremer often said, a free and democratic Iraq, at peace at home and with its neighbors. Reaching that goal required tactical flexibility, including an abrupt change of plans last fall to accommodate Sistani. Bremer has never met Sistani, but he communicated with him, effectively it turned out, through intermediaries. Sistani wants a democratic Iraq in which Shia will obviously be politically dominant. Because he has favored elections as early as possible, Sistani loathed Bremer's seven-step plan that would have required, first, the selection by caucuses of an assembly to write a constitution, after which Iraq would get its sovereignty back and, finally, hold a real, direct election.

At Sistani's behest, members of the Governing Council lobbied Bremer to come up with a speedier plan. To Bremer, this was a tactical matter, meaning he had flexibility. He traveled to Washington, met with Bush, and produced the November 15 agreement, which required an interim government, a temporary constitution, the handover of sovereignty by June 30, and an election by next January. Sistani was satisfied with everything but the section of the constitution that would have allowed Kurds to veto it. Bremer refused to buckle on that point, and Sistani backed down.

Bremer's most misunderstood move was the luring of Brahimi to Iraq to set up the interim government. Brahimi is an Arab nationalist from Algeria, a socialist, and a Sunni. Sistani was initially sympathetic to inviting Brahimi, until the United Nations, after a quick investigation last fall, found that a snap election in Iraq wasn't feasible. Bremer brought Brahimi in anyway, then played him like

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a violin to get the political result he wanted. This included the selection of Allawi, who'd become close to both Bremer and his spokesman Dan Senor, as prime minister.

Brahimi knew little about Iraq, even less about the emerging crop of politicians. So, as Bremer suspected, Brahimi had to rely heavily on him and his CPA aides to find the top officials for the interim government. In this process, Allawi stayed one step ahead of Brahimi. Knowing where Brahimi was going for consultations, Allawi would get there first, talk to local leaders, and persuade them to recommend him to Brahimi. Meanwhile, Bremer was talking up Allawi in private sessions with the U.N. envoy. Brahimi was whipsawed. After the envoy's first choice for prime minister was quickly shot down by Allawi's backers, it was inevitable Allawi would be chosen.

The Brahimi scheme was misunderstood in two ways. Some American conservatives were alarmed the U.N. was being given broad authority in Iraq. And many in the media claimed the president had reversed a policy of keeping the U.N. out entirely. But Brahimi's role was minimal. He exerted little influence while bestowing the imprimatur of the U.N. on Allawi's government. Bush and Bremer had all along insisted a U.N. role in Iraq was "vital." In fact, Bremer and the late U.N. envoy Sergio de Mello had worked together to select members of the Iraqi Governing Council. De Mello was killed when the U.N. building in Baghdad was bombed on August 19, 2003. That same day, Bremer called U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan to urge him to keep a U.N. presence in Iraq. Annan promised he would. Two days later, Annan ordered all U.N. personnel out.

Bremer's final act was his most audacious: the handover of sovereignty on June 28, two days early. It was cooked up by Bremer and Allawi. The idea was to flummox the Baathists and terrorists, upset their plans for attacks on June 29 and 30, and demonstrate the readiness of Allawi to take charge. Nine months earlier, Bremer had sought to cede more power to the Governing Council if only it would name a single leader—in effect, a prime minister. Instead, it named nine rotating presidents, an unworkable system. Now there was a single leader whom Rice calls "competent, tough, plain-spoken, and very brave." Hours after Allawi took over as leader of a sovereign Iraq, Bremer left, his job done, not perfectly, but well enough to warrant a president's grateful embrace. ♦

FEEL THE LOVE

Go gavel-to-gavel with John-John at *weeklystandard.com*

Starting Monday, July 26, we'll be in Boston, covering every move at the Democratic convention. Our writers will be on the scene, providing the play-by-play and color commentary—instantly available to you at *weeklystandard.com.*

(Circle August 30 on your calendar, too, when when we'll be doing the same during the Republican convention.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"A Little Literary Flair"

Joe Wilson wasn't a truth-teller

By Matthew Continetti

One day last October, Ambassador Joe Wilson, his wife Valerie in tow, traveled to the National Press Club in downtown Washington, D.C., for lunch. It was a big day for Wilson. He was the guest of honor at a banquet thrown by the Nation Institute, which publishes the *Nation*, the venerable lefty weekly. Daniel Ellsberg was there. So was New Jersey senator Jon Corzine. Towards the end of lunch, plates of cold salad shunted aside, Wilson was invited onstage. Looking the part of a globetrotting former diplomat in his Zegna suit and trademark Hermès tie, he launched into a tirade against the Bush administration, which he claimed had ignored the findings of a trip he took to Niger in February 2002 to investigate claims that Saddam Hussein's Iraq had tried to acquire uranium there. His trip had disproved those claims, he continued, yet his findings were ignored. And when he went public with his story, the administration had tried to "silence" him by leaking to the press that his wife worked for the CIA.

There was much applause. And there was even more applause when Wilson then accepted the first-ever Ron Ridenhour Award for Truth-Telling, along with the award's $10,000 prize. (Ridenhour was the soldier who exposed the My Lai massacre in 1969.)

The *Nation* (and cosponsoring Fertel Foundation) might want to ask for their prize money back. Because the report by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, released on July 9, fatally undermines Wilson's accusation that the Bush administration "manipulated" intelligence by ignoring his report on Niger—which, in a July 6, 2003, *New York Times* op-ed, he mistakenly claimed "was circulated to the appropriate officials within our government," including the office of Vice President Dick Cheney.

Not so, according to the Senate committee's report on pre-Iraq war intelligence. Not so at all.

Matthew Continetti is a reporter at The Weekly Standard.

The first public mention of Joe Wilson's February 2002 mission to Niger appeared in a May 6, 2003, column by Nicholas D. Kristof in the *New York Times*. Shortly before, Wilson had met Kristof at a Senate Democratic Policy Committee conference in the capital. As Wilson later recounted to *Vanity Fair*, he told Kristof about his trip to Niger over breakfast the next morning, and said "Kristof could write about it, but not name him."

Kristof, the first of Wilson's many journalistic victims, accepted Wilson's claims at face value. "I do know from talking to people directly involved in the Niger deal that information did go to the vice president's office and did go to the national security staff in the White House and went to the top of the CIA," he told an NPR interviewer on June 25, 2003.

But read the various claims made in Kristof's May 6 column side by side with the Senate Intelligence Committee's findings, and you find two different stories. Here's Kristof: "In February 2002, according to someone present at the meetings, that envoy reported to the CIA and State Department that the information [of a Niger-Iraq uranium deal] was unequivocally wrong and that the documents [purporting to show such a deal] had been forged."

Wilson did report back to the CIA after he returned from Niger. And Wilson did say he was skeptical about claims of an Iraq-Niger uranium deal. But according to the committee's findings, Wilson did not report, by any reckoning, that the information was "unequivocally wrong" or that documents "had been forged" to show a deal. Indeed, he couldn't have.

That's because the bogus documents in question were not turned over to CIA personnel until October 16, 2002, about eight months after Wilson had returned from Niger. Also, according to the Senate Intelligence Committee, at Wilson's initial February 19, 2002, meeting in CIA headquarters, "none of the meeting participants recall telling the former ambassador the source of the report."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This is how Pat Roberts, the committee's chairman, put it in his "additional views" section of the report:

> At the time the former ambassador traveled to Niger, the Intelligence Community did not have in its possession any actual documents on the alleged Niger-Iraq uranium deal, only second hand reporting of the deal. The former ambassador's comments to reporters . . . could not have been based on the former ambassador's actual experiences because the Intelligence Community did not have the documents at the time of the ambassador's trip.

The Senate Committee asked Wilson how he could have come to such grandiose conclusions without any information:

> On at least two occasions [Wilson] admitted that he had no direct knowledge to support some of his claims and that he was drawing on either unrelated past experiences or no information at all. For example, when asked how he "knew" that the Intelligence Community had rejected the possibility of a Niger-Iraq uranium deal, as he wrote in his book, he told Committee staff that his assertion may have involved "a little literary flair."

"A little literary flair" is a good way to describe the following claim, also in the original Kristof column: "The envoy's debunking of the forgery was passed around the administration and seemed to be accepted—except that President Bush and the State Department kept citing it [the forgery] anyway."

The Select Committee discovered otherwise:

> DIA and CIA analysts said that when they saw the intelligence report they did not believe that it supplied much new information and did not think that it clarified the story on the alleged Iraq-Niger uranium deal. They did not find Nigerien denials that they had discussed uranium sales with Iraq as very surprising because they had no expectation that Niger would admit to such an agreement if it did exist. The analysts did, however, find it interesting that the former Nigerien Prime Minister said [to Wilson] an Iraqi delegation had visited Niger [in 1999] for what [the prime minister] believed was to discuss uranium sales.
>
> Because CIA analysts did not believe that the report added any new information to clarify the issue, they did not use the report to produce any further analytical products or highlight the report for policymakers. For the same reason, CIA's briefer did not brief the Vice President on the report, despite the Vice President's previous questions about the issue.

The story Wilson told Nicholas Kristof that May morning in Washington? Wilson made it up.

And he got away with it. And he began to talk more frequently with reporters. The *Washington Post*'s Walter Pincus, for one. Here is an excerpt from a Pincus article published on June 12, 2003:

> During his trip, the CIA's envoy spoke with the president of Niger and other Niger officials mentioned as being involved in the Iraqi effort, some of whose signatures purportedly appeared on the documents.
>
> After returning to the United States, the envoy reported to the CIA that the uranium-purchase story was false, the sources said. Among the envoy's conclusions was that the documents may have been forged because the "dates were wrong and the names were wrong," the former U.S. government official said.

During the Senate Intelligence Committee's investigation, someone asked Wilson how he could have told Pincus the "dates were wrong and the names were wrong," as he never saw the forgeries in the first place. Wilson was nonplussed. According to the report, "The former ambassador said that he may have 'misspoken' to the reporter when he said he concluded the documents were 'forged.'" Also, he said, "he may have become confused about his own recollection after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported in March 2003 that the names and dates on the documents were not correct and may have thought he had seen the names himself."

Maybe Wilson was confused, too, when he talked to Spencer Ackerman and John B. Judis for a June 30, 2003, *New Republic* cover story, "The First Casualty":

> Cheney's office [in early 2002] had received from the British, via the Italians, documents purporting to show Iraq's purchase of uranium from Niger. Cheney had given the information to the CIA, which in turn asked a prominent diplomat, who had served as ambassador to three African countries, to investigate. He returned after a visit to Niger in February 2002 and reported to the State Department and the CIA that the documents were forgeries. The CIA circulated the ambassador's report to the vice president's office, the ambassador confirms to TNR. But, after a British dossier was released in September [2002] detailing the purported uranium purchase, administration officials began citing it anyway, culminating in its inclusion in the [2003] State of the Union. "They knew the Niger story was a flat-out lie," the former ambassador tells TNR.

Once again, the Senate Intelligence Committee report refutes all of this. The forged documents first showed up in October 2002, when an Italian journalist gave them to the U.S. embassy in Rome, which forwarded them to the CIA. Why did Cheney query the CIA in February 2002 about Niger? Because of a Defense Intelligence Agency report that same month titled *Niamey* [the capital of Niger] *signed an agreement to sell 500 tons of uranium a year to Baghdad.* This report was thinly sourced, the CIA would later inform Cheney, which is one of the reasons they sent Wilson to investigate.

With the Kristof column, the Pincus piece, and the Judis/Ackerman article, however, Wilson was just getting warmed up. On July 6, 2003, Wilson went public with his story in three venues: an op-ed in the *New York Times*, an

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

appearance on *Meet the Press*, and a front-page story in the *Washington Post*. In all three places Wilson told a yarn riddled with inaccuracies and, in some parts, constructed out of whole cheesecloth.

Records of his trip, he wrote in the *Times*, "should include" a "specific answer from the agency to the office of the vice president (this may have been delivered orally)." Wilson had "every confidence that the answer I provided was circulated to the appropriate officials within our government." Well, that depends on the meaning of *appropriate*. It certainly didn't get circulated to the vice president.

The exaggerations and falsehoods continued on that day's *Meet the Press*. His trip, Wilson told guest host Andrea Mitchell, "effectively debunked the Niger arms uranium sale." In fact, as the report details, it did no such thing. In his addendum to the Intelligence Committee report, Pat Roberts regrets that, while not disputing the facts, his "Democratic colleagues refused to allow" several "conclusions" about Wilson to appear in the report. Among them: "The Committee found that, for most analysts, the former ambassador's report lent more credibility, not less to the reported Niger-Iraq uranium deal."


Joe Wilson

Earl Kelemy

Wilson further told Mitchell that Vice President Cheney and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice lied when they said they had not heard of him before his *New York Times* op-ed. He said, "If you are in the vice president's office, or you're a senior director at the National Security Council, you are senior enough to ask the question, you will get a specific response." He said, "The office of the vice president, I am absolutely convinced, received a very specific response to the question it asked and that response was based upon my trip out there."

Or not. The Senate Intelligence Committee found that Wilson didn't know what he was talking about. He repeated the same bogus charges to *Washington Post* reporters Walter Pincus and Richard Leiby, who included them in their sympathetic profile the same day.

Similar credulity dominated coverage of Wilson's accusations. What's puzzling is that at times intelligence officials, quoted on background, also supported Wilson's claims. In a July 9, 2003, *Newsday* story by Timothy M. Phelps, for example, a "senior intelligence official" agreed with Wilson that his report "was widely disseminated" throughout the Bush administration. This wasn't the case.

By last October, when Wilson accepted the "Truth-Teller" award, the Niger scandal had taken an unusual turn. The Justice Department was investigating whether an administration official or officials had broken the law by telling columnist Robert Novak in July 2003 that Wilson's wife was a CIA operative. The Justice Department investigation afforded Wilson further media opportunities. He seized them. Appearing for a second time on *Meet the Press* on October 5, he was asked by Tim Russert, "Was there a suggestion that this was cronyism, that it was your wife who had arranged the mission?"

"I have no idea what they were trying to suggest in this," Wilson said. "I can only assume that it was nepotism. And I can tell you that when the decision was made, which was made after a briefing and after a gaming out at the agency with the intelligence community, there was nobody in that room when we went through this that I knew." He makes a similar claim in his memoir, *The Politics of Truth*, published earlier this year: "Valerie could not—and would not if she could—have had anything to do with the CIA decision to ask me to travel to Niamey." And Wilson told liberal blogger Joshua Micah Marshall the same thing, at greater length, in a September 2003 interview:

> For those who would assert that somehow [my wife] was involved in this, it just defies logic. At the time, she was the mother of 2-year-old twins. Therefore, sort of sending her husband off on an eight-day trip leaves her with full responsibility for taking care of two screaming 2-year-olds without help, and anybody who is a parent would understand what that means. Anybody who is a mother would understand it even far better.

And yet here, too, the Senate Intelligence Committee found problems with Wilson's story. "Some CPD [Counterproliferation Division] officials could not recall how the office decided to contact [Wilson]," its report says. "However, interviews and documents provided to the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Committee indicate that his wife, a CPD employee, suggested his name for the trip." There's more: "The CPD reports officer told Committee staff that the former ambassador's wife 'offered up his name,' and a memorandum to the Deputy Chief of the CPD on February 12, 2002, from the former ambassador's wife, says, 'my husband has good relations with both the PM [prime minister] and the former Minister of Mines (not to mention lots of French contacts), both of whom could possibly shed light on this sort of activity.'"

Wilson continued to receive uncritical press. Walter Pincus wrote up his October 5 *Meet the Press* appearance for the *Washington Post* the next day, and two days after that, Wilson and his wife were the subjects of another gauzy *Washington Post* profile by Richard Leiby and Dana Priest. In January 2004 came Vicky Ward's 7,000-word profile of the couple in *Vanity Fair*. In May 2004, when Wilson's book was released, he appeared once more on *Meet the Press*, where he scolded Tim Russert:

"Remember," he said, "when you talk about [being] partisan, what I did was my civic duty to hold my government to account for what it had said, a pattern of deception to the Congress of the United States and the American people, including these 16 words in the State of the Union address"—in which the president said Iraq had been seeking uranium for its weapons program in Africa. He paused. "I did not put those 16 words in the State of the Union address. Indeed, had the president heeded the report that I and others had submitted, had the vice president heeded what the CIA briefer had told him, had the national security adviser and her deputy remembered the two memoranda and the telephone call relating to this particular subject, that line might not have been in the president's State of the Union address."

His eyes grew wide with fury.

"Either they were derelict or they were deceptive."

According to the conclusions of Sen. Pat Roberts, the words "derelict" and "deceptive" might better describe Joe Wilson:

> During Mr. Wilson's media blitz, he appeared on more than thirty television shows including entertainment venues. Time and again, Joe Wilson told anyone who would listen that the President had lied to the American people, that the Vice President had lied, and that he had "debunked" the claim that Iraq was seeking uranium from Africa. As discussed in the Niger section of the report, not only did he NOT "debunk" the claim, he actually gave some intelligence analysts even more reason to believe that it may be true. I believed very strongly that it was important for the Committee to conclude publicly that many of the statements made by Ambassador Wilson were not only incorrect, but had no basis in fact. . . . .
>
> The former Ambassador, either by design or through ignorance, gave the American people and, for that matter, the world a version of events that was inaccurate, unsubstantiated, and misleading. Surely, the Senate Intelligence Committee, which has unique access to all of the facts, should have been able to agree on a conclusion that would correct the public record.

However, committee Democrats, Roberts writes, "would not agree" to conclude publicly that much of Wilson's story was fabricated. Perhaps they were embarrassed. Many of them had grown to know Wilson socially over the last year, and many had adopted his cause as their own. Perhaps they did not want to embarrass the Kerry campaign, for which Wilson remains an unpaid adviser. Perhaps they did not want to embarrass media outlets like the *Washington Post*, the *New York Times*, and the *New Republic*, which published Wilson's falsehoods and have not yet retracted them.

Wilson, for his part, has laid low since the committee released its report. He has not done any television interviews. He has refused most requests for interviews, period. On Thursday, July 15, Wilson sent out an email to a host of reporters—including many whom he had snookered months ago. Attached was a long, rambling letter to Pat Roberts and Jay Rockefeller, in which he disputes the Senate Intelligence Committee's findings. The idea his wife had suggested him for the Niger trip "is not true," Wilson wrote, adding that his wife's memo touting his credentials contains "no suggestion or recommendation in that statement that I be sent on the trip."

Wilson's letter is mainly notable for what it does not mention. He does not dispute the committee's finding that he was wrong to say he knew his report had reached the vice president's office, when he had no way of knowing whether it had or hadn't. He does not admit he was wrong to tell reporters that he knew the forged documents were bogus, when he had not seen them at the time of his trip. He does not leave the door open for future discussions about his trip, either with Congress or with the press.

Which is telling. Until now, Wilson had shown himself eager to talk to anyone who would listen—including this magazine. He was an engaging interview subject. In July 2003, when he sat down with *Post* reporters Richard Leiby and Walter Pincus for his first on-the-record interview, Wilson waxed philosophical. "It really comes down to the administration misrepresenting the facts on an issue that was a fundamental justification for going to war," he said. One likes to think he was smoking one of his favorite cigars at the time—Romeo y Julietas, perhaps.

And then, turning to the two sympathetic journalists, Wilson, a curious expression on his face, asked, to no one in particular: "What else are they lying about?"

As it turns out, that was a question better put to the administration's critics. ♦

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Turkey Paradox

Joining Europe means becoming more Islamist

By Christopher Caldwell

Istanbul

There were plenty of flashy cocktail dresses at the NATO summit reception hosted by Turkey's foreign minister Abdullah Gül last month. There were plenty of headscarves, too—and the most conservative of these belonged to Gül's wife. Hers was a festive, modern, maroon version of what the Turks call a *turban*, tucked tight under the chin and bisecting the forehead to hide all hair. The cocktail-dress women were joking and cavorting with the wimple women. Mrs. Gül posed cheerily for photos with European and American friends.

There are few societies in which the veil and the cocktail dress coexist for long. One usually drives the other out. It was modern clothing that supplanted traditional Islamic garb—by force of law—when Kemal Atatürk took over the Turkish state in 1923, and launched a ruthless program of modernization and secularization on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. So the juxtaposition of head coverings and Western coiffure is something new. The wife of a Turkish cabinet minister would not have been seen in a headscarf 50—or 10—years ago. But Turkey's brand-new AK party, heir to two banned religious parties, took power in November 2002 and has spent the last two years trying to carve out a place for Islam in Turkish public life. And that it is doing so while trying to deepen Turkey's ties to Europe is not so paradoxical as it might seem.

The world's most rigorously secular state for the past 80 years, Turkey was an early member of NATO. It has sought membership in the European Union since 1963, when the E.U. was the European Economic Community and had just six members. In the intervening decades, the E.U. has turned into a world-government-in-embryo and has admitted 19 new members, including most of Eastern Europe, parts of ex-Yugoslavia, and three states of the former Soviet Union. Even such economic and political laggards as Romania and Bulgaria are slated to join in 2007. Evidently it doesn't take much to get into the E.U., yet Turkey has persistently been shut out. Europeans have always found reasons to refuse to start a normal multiyear accession process: that only 5 percent of the Turkish landmass lies in Europe, for instance, while the remainder is in Asia Minor; or that Turkey's per capita income is only 20 percent of the European average.

The most frequent grounds for rejection was that the Kemalist state, erected as a bulwark against political Islam, was undemocratic. And this is true. It forbade the Islamic veil in schools and among government functionaries (and the tasseled fez everywhere). It tightly controlled religious exercise, and the centralized department of religious doctrine (the Diyanet) composed and distributed the sermons that local imams gave every Friday. What's more, the Kemalist state gave the army a formal role in government. This meant a free hand to shut down Islamist parties and quash guerrilla uprisings in Kurdish areas along Turkey's borders with Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Nor was the government fastidious about whether captured rebels were tortured or locked up without due process. Army officers, naturally, were monitored closely for religious enthusiasm, and purged from the ranks if evidence emerged of Islamist sentiment or undue mosque attendance. And this army, for all the help it had given to NATO, could be a headache abroad, too, as when it occupied and partitioned the Greek-controlled island of Cyprus in 1974.

But Turks never thought this was the real reason for their exclusion from Europe. Former Turkish prime minister Mesut Yilmaz accused Helmut Kohl in 1997 of wanting to keep any Muslim state out of Europe's "Christian club." While Turkey has long been a secular state, it has never been a secular society along the lines of the one that has developed in Europe since World War II. In fact, it is quite devout even among Muslim societies, and over the past decade has shared the experience of most Islamic

Christopher Caldwell is a senior editor of The Weekly Standard.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

places (and of the United States) in seeing a renewed interest in the religious life and a deepening devotion among its middle classes. Yilmaz's view was at least partly correct. Surely it matters that Turkey is Islamic and Europe is not.

It has never been possible for Europe to say this, but in the 1990s it became incorrect even to *think* it. So a decade ago, the E.U. guiltily established its so-called "Copenhagen criteria," which made explicit just what Turkey was doing wrong as an aspiring candidate—concerning democracy, human rights, justice, religion, and Cyprus. Nobody worried when, in 1995, Turkey got its first Islamist-led government, and nobody worried when that government was pressured by the army into giving up power. Turks were even given broader trading privileges as a way of making life outside the E.U. more tolerable. When the country became an official candidate for the E.U. in 1999, Turkey had started to lurch between Kemalism and Islamism. But by then, matters looked satisfactorily deadlocked. Turkey could not enter Europe without meeting the Copenhagen criteria. And no Turkish government could meet the Copenhagen criteria without risking social and political collapse.

EPA / Landov

Tony Blair with Recep Tayyip Erdogan, May 2004

This October, the European Commission will issue a report in Brussels on Turkey's compliance with the Copenhagen criteria. At a summit in Amsterdam two months later, Europe's 25 countries will decide whether to "give a date" (as the E.U. jargon has it) for full Turkish accession. No candidate that has "gotten a date" has ever been rejected, not even the corruption-plagued slackers of southeastern Europe. The E.U. must now ask itself whether Turkey is a rare hybrid society, possessed of the "moderate Islam" that statesmen the world over have a duty to reward when they find it, or whether it is yet another secular state in the Islamic world that is about to tip back into theocracy.

And there has been a complication. Fourteen months after September 11, Turkey brought to power the AK party, led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the incorruptible and efficient former mayor of Istanbul. A charismatic orator with a voice such as politicians had before microphones were invented, Erdogan had risen through the apparatus of two religious parties, the Welfare party and the Virtue party, both eventually banned. Erdogan himself had been removed from his post as mayor and jailed for four months in 1998 after reading a poem about minarets and bayonets at a rally. For several months after the AK party's November 2002 accession to power, Gül had to serve as interim prime minister, until parliament could amend the constitution to restore Erdogan's eligibility for political office.

If Erdogan was devout (his wife, like Gül's, wears the headscarf), he was never a religious monomaniac. He was a gifted coalition-builder. A business school graduate himself, he has guarded his relations with Turkey's business classes, and many describe his party as being what the German Christian Democrats were when the churches were still a religious force in German life. And to the extreme discomfiture of European leaders, he has found a democratic instrument for bringing about the Islamization of Turkish life that the AK party seeks. That instrument is the Copenhagen criteria.

Europe's leaders and Europe's public don't see eye to eye on Turkey. Germany's foreign minister Joschka Fischer is now finishing a brief for Turkish E.U. membership, in which he will argue that globalization will foster jihad unless moderate alternatives can be found. Turkish admission has become one of the rare issues on which French president Jacques Chirac is unwilling to compromise: He wants Turkey in. And Tony Blair wants Turkey in, too, largely for reasons of human rights and ecumenism (although Blair's continental foes smell an English plan to dilute the E.U.'s cultural pretensions). Washington has been slow, even after Turkey's dramatic refusal to host the U.S. 4th Infantry Division in the run-up to the Iraq war, to accept just how deeply Turkish

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

public opinion has turned against the United States since the Cold War. (Opposition to the Iraq war ran well over *90 percent.*) At the Istanbul summit, George W. Bush even goaded the Europeans to admit Turkey—prompting Chirac to tell him to butt out. Among Western politicians, only two have taken an unambiguous stand against membership: former French president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Germany's Christian Democrat leader Angela Merkel, who made her case forcefully during a week-long tour of Turkey in February.

Majorities of the public in all E.U. states oppose Turkish entry into the union. Their reasons are numerous and considerably more specific than those of Europe's political leaders. There are four main ones:

First are various population issues. Since passing its guest-worker laws in the early 1960s, Germany has acquired several million Turkish residents. More through Germany's fault than Turkey's, these newcomers have proved extremely endogamous and hard to assimilate. Turkey has 69 million people, and its population is growing at developing-world rates. Should it get admitted, it will by that time be considerably larger than any of Europe's other countries. This means the possible influx of tens of millions of Turks into a Europe saddled with structural unemployment—and a voting bloc in the European parliament so enormous that no one could do anything to stop it.

Second are related economic questions. Turkey's per capita GNP is growing, but is still only $3,400. A banking collapse in early 2001 was contained, thanks to the largest IMF loan ever, but gigantic payments will soon come due. The AK party has been rigorous in following the IMF plan, and inflation has fallen close to single digits for the first time in decades. (The Turkish lira, which 20 years ago was in the same logarithmic neighborhood as the dollar, is now worth 1/13,000th of a cent.) And Turkish accession will not be cheap. Europe's leaders argue that in a global economy, it is unrealistic for Turkey to expect the billions in "development funds" that eased the accession of new members—even turning Ireland and Spain into developed economies. Turkey's leaders say they understand. But such assurances mean nothing. Once Turkey enters the E.U., the continent's voters will be offered a stark choice between paying for economic opportunity in Anatolia and welcoming a large fraction of the Turkish labor market into their cities. Wisely or not, they will probably choose the former. They will probably get both.

Third is the question of security in its various guises: The al Qaeda bombings in Istanbul last November were sobering to Europeans, who may flinch from belonging to



"Roger Kimball's new book sets out to repair the damage inflicted on art history by the likes of Derrida and Foucault; it is, in short, a restoration project, and a most cogent one. Kimball discredits today's politically correct art historians, who aim to impose their own political agendas sexuality, feminism, race, a variety of exogenous notions upon works of art. Through Kimball's deft argument, the reader will come to realize that the main goal of an artist may not really be to trick us ordinary mortals into accepting what we see at face value, while providing the secret code to his political message only to the clever 'new' art historians whose understanding of the scheme will assure them tenure."

Philippe de Montebello, Director
Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York

Colleges and universities used to teach art history to encourage connoisseurship and acquaint students with the riches of our artistic heritage. But, as Roger Kimball shows in this witty and provocative book, today's students are less likely to learn about the aesthetics of master works than be told, for instance, that Peter Paul Rubens's great painting "Drunken Silenus" is an allegory about rape; or that Jan van Eyck's masterful Arnolfini Portrait is about "middle-class deceptions... and the treatment of women;" or that Winslow Homer's "The Gulf Stream" is "a visual encoding of racism."

The Rape of the Masters exposes the charlatanry that fuels much academic art history and oozes into the art world generally. It also provides an engaging antidote to the tendentious, politically motivated assaults on our treasured sources of culture and civilization that take place in today's universities, museums, and art galleries.

ENCOUNTER BOOKS

At bookstores everywhere or call 800-786-3839
www.encounterbooks.com

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a political union that borders on Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Europeans might also ask how they will treat the Kurdish aspiration for independence, once it becomes a domestic problem. A geostrategist might weigh these liabilities against an asset: Turkey has a vast conventional military capability that the other European states lack, including a larger battle-ready army than any on the continent. But this is not the way European publics like to think. A related problem is that, once Turkey gets into the E.U., no logic remains against admitting countries from all over Africa and Asia. The E.U. would thus either expand into empire or dilute into a trading bloc, depending how you look at it. The American-educated president of former-Soviet Georgia, Mikhail Saakashvili, took many aback at the NATO summit when he suggested that it was long past time that his own country be admitted: "Every country that has European culture and transatlantic aspirations," he said, "will join the Western community."

There is, finally, the question of Islam. Turkish Islam is indeed in many ways the moderate construction that people say it is. Not until the 1980s did a Turkish president—Turgut Özal—make the *hajj* to Mecca (although after Erdogan the *hajj* may become a requirement for national politicians). Only about one of every 30 Turkish Muslims supports a radical agenda (sharia law, Koranic punishment, and so on), according to the Istanbul think tank TESEV, and even extremely conservative politicians will shake hands with female foreign correspondents. Matters are made more confusing by the fact that one of the most dangerous Islamist groups—Turkish Hezbollah—was consolidated by the secularist state as a paramilitary force useful against the Kurdish nationalist PKK movement. Sunni Islam is the official creed of the national religious authorities, but Turkey's Islam is also marked by "*alevi*" currents of Central Asian shamanism and by the so-called *fethullahci*. Their modern, communitarian Islam, with its emphasis on education and citizenship, is present in the AK party's stated goal that it seeks "not an Islamic state but a state run by Islamic people," or Erdogan's avowal, "In the office I'm a democrat; at home I'm a Muslim."

For all that, polling done by the European Values Survey and published in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* finds yawning differences between Europe's basic values and Turkey's. Eighteen percent of Europeans (39 percent in Eastern Europe) agree that "politicians who do not believe in God are unfit to hold political office," a view held by 62 percent of Turks. To the question whether they would mind having a homosexual as a neighbor, 19 percent of Europeans say yes, versus 90 percent of Turks. As for Jews, 8.3 percent of Western Europeans would mind having one as a neighbor, as would 62 percent of Turks. Fifty-nine percent of Turks think women should wear the headscarf.

The AK party is dedicated to giving the Turk in the street what he wants, and he—like his American counterpart and unlike his European one—wants more religion in public life. Turkey's secularism, *laiklik*, is modeled on French *laïcité*, rather than on Anglo-Saxon notions of the separation of church and state. In the context of the "half-military regime" that Atatürk installed in the 1920s, this makes it very hard to distinguish between left and right. Article 159 of the Turkish Penal Code long made it a crime to criticize the government, ministers, the military, or the police. So the same forces that repress imams have been used to repress Communists, journalists, Kurds, and some guy who wanted to start a company that might compete with a state cement factory. The consensus that Turkey suffers from an "excess of secularism" thus extends far beyond the ranks of the religious.

As a result, it has occurred to many people that you could make life freer and more modern for everyone in the country by allowing Islam more breathing room in the Kemalist state. Islamists were the top party in municipal elections in 1994, when Erdogan was elected mayor of Istanbul. But when Necmettin Erbakan's Welfare party took over the national government the same year, it immediately went overboard—launching an Islamist foreign policy through visits to Libya and Iran, reintroducing the Koran in public schools, and banning alcohol in many public places. When the Iranian ambassador issued his call to jihad at a Welfare party festival in 1997, the army sent out tanks in a show of force, and Erbakan felt compelled to submit to a number of explicit renunciations that eroded his prestige.

Kemal Atatürk's cult of personality survives—his photograph appears on the walls of all rooms in all public buildings and in most private offices—but ritual is beginning to crowd out faith, and Kemalism is getting a bad name. The last real coup was mounted in 1980 and brought executions, political repression, and a Kurdish uprising in its train. The "postmodern coup" of 1997 brought corruption and Turkey's biggest-ever banking collapse. And if that last coup in defense of Kemalism was not a real one, it may be because, as the army discovered, political Islam had grown considerably more powerful since 1980. "Kemalism" has come to play the same role in Turkish politics as "the legacy of Jim Crow" did in America, say, 30 years ago. It is useful as a bogeyman, but is too weak and encrusted to represent anything genuinely dangerous.

It is Erdogan's AK party, with a parliamentary majority so big it can alter the constitution if it wishes, that has

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

turned into the most powerful force in Turkish politics. Erdogan's approach to forming a kind of popular front against the Kemalist state has been less obvious, more modern, and considerably more brilliant than Erbakan's. Rather than democratizing the state by Islamicizing the country, he seeks to Islamicize the country by democratizing the state.

AK is an acronym for Justice and Development, but it is also a Turkish word for "white" or, more to the point, "clean." A "state run by Muslim people" is likely to be a state run by upright people, and after the corruption of the 1990s, and the debacle of 2001, AK was able to run as an anti-establishment and reformist party of clean government. "The AK party," a secular opposition politician admitted in Istanbul a few weeks ago, "is the cream of the Islamic people." But AK leaders like Ibrahim Ozal, nephew of the former prime minister, don't like being described as belonging to a "new Islamic party," preferring the Christian-Democrat analogy. The AK party's quick success in righting the economy, its transparency (it posts its accounts on the Internet), and its commitment to the reforms required by the E.U. quickly made it the sounding board for every possible discontent with the state. Its plurality in the popular vote rose from 35 percent to 42 percent in recent municipal elections. And most of the legislation of recent years has had as its aim bringing Turkey into conformity with Europe's Copenhagen criteria. Basically the E.U. is warning Erdogan that he will have to get the army out of public life. And Erdogan is saying, "Oh, don't throw me in that briar patch!"

Erdogan recently reorganized Turkey's National Security Council, the MGK, so that the military reports directly to the prime minister. This allowed him to cancel billions of dollars in military spending, an unprecedented act of defiance which can variously be seen as fiscal prudence, democratic accountability, or an attempt to weaken the bulwark of the country's secularism. His government's openness to Kurdish cultural rights—including broadcasts in the Kurdish language—can be seen either as democratic progress or as an attempt to weaken the prestige of the army in its main sphere of duty over the past two decades.

In some ways Turkey is pursuing its traditional foreign policy. "If we didn't have NATO today," Erdogan said at the NATO summit, "we would be establishing it now, and it would be our key task to establish it now." But in other ways, Turkey is shifting its foreign-policy priorities radically. Erdogan backed a U.N. referendum on the reunification of Cyprus held this spring—against the wishes of the army. When Turkish Cypriots stunned the world by voting yes, and Greek Cypriots did the same by voting no, much of the stigma of Turkey's three-decade-long occupation was lifted, and another obstacle on the road to Europe was removed.

Turkey has also tried to close the issue of sovereignty over Turkish Kurdistan, while reopening a window on Iraqi Kurdistan. Turkey views oil-rich Kirkuk, over which it lost sovereignty in the 1920s, as a Turkic (specifically Turkmen) city. Unsurprisingly, Iraqis urged the United States to give a polite "No" to Turkey's offer to send 15,000 troops to the region in 2003. Israel is growing increasingly unpopular in Turkey, and the AK party has been quick to pick fights with it. After Israeli security forces assassinated the Hamas founder and leader Sheikh Yassin, Turkey withdrew its ambassador from Tel Aviv for consultations, and Erdogan accused Israel of "state terrorism." When some noted that this was language of unusual harshness coming from Turkey (which has seldom condemned Israeli actions of any kind), Erdogan said, "Our attitude is in line with the E.U.'s."

Erdogan is the most modern politician in Turkey. He has his strength in the cities, not the countryside. But the distinction between the two is eroding. As in Mexico City, the mayor of Istanbul is a *national* leader. Istanbul has sextupled in size since the 1960s, to a population of 11 million, and peasants have reconstituted their village life (while sitting around TVs) in high-rise apartment blocks and shantytowns. Even the wealthy subdivisions popping up around Istanbul—places with names like Bahcesehir (Garden City) and houses that sell for $150,000—have gigantic mosques in the middle of them. Erdogan's party is full of businessmen from the Anatolian center of the country who have made their millions in high-tech capitalism without losing their religious beliefs.

Turkey for now has more in common with the United States, a capitalist democracy where religion is woven into upper-middle-class life, than with Europe, which has an increasingly hard time making sense of belief. Erdogan's big battle of this spring involved improving the standing of *imam-hatip* schools, public schools that offer Koranic and Arabic instruction. He withdrew his proposed legislation but has promised to bring it back. Notoriously, he told a reporter a decade ago that he thought of democracy as a streetcar: "You ride it until you arrive at your destination, then you step off." His Turkish opponents warn that he has a "hidden agenda," but that's not exactly true. His agenda remains consistent—both Islamization and democratization—and as long as Europe keeps insisting that Turkey reform itself into something less European, he has nothing to hide. ♦

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from the makers of the George W Bush talking action figure, the most popular political collectable in history..

Go Ahead... Make My Day!

"talking" *(visit website & listen)*

President Reagan

commemorative action figure

a portion of proceeds to benifit the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Foundatio

Introducing our Ronald Reagan 12 inch tall talking action figure. 14 months in the making, this is the latest addition to the TalkingPresidents.com action figure line. This product is exclusively licensed by the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Foundation. Welcome back to Reagan Country, order yours... it'll make your day!

$29.99 TalkingPresidents.com

- Relive the wit, wisdom and optimism of The Great Communicator expertly crafted to exacting detail, from that familiar smile to the perfect pocket square
- Comes in an elegant collector's box
- Says President Reagans most patriotic, positive and prolific soundbites... in his own voice!

partial selection of soundbites below, visit website for additional quotes.

"I have only one thing to say to the tax increasers, go ahead, make my day"

"Mr. Gorbachev, Tear down this wall"

"I will not make age an issue of this campaign. I am not going to exploit for political purposes my opponents youth and inexperience"

"There you go again"

"you and I have a rendezvous with destiny"



USE OF THE NAME, PERSONA, VOICE, IMAGE, AND LIKENESS OF RONALD REAGAN ON THIS PRODUCT IS WITH THE SOLE PERMISSION OF THE RONALD REAGAN PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY FOUNDATION.
WWW.REAGANFOUNDATION.ORG

three ways to order:

1. mail to:
Talking Presidents
18 Technology Suite 150
Irvine, CA 92618

2. call toll free:
(800) 760-3646

3. ORDER ON LINE BEST WAY www.TALKINGPRESIDENTS.com

please send me (QTY)

- ☐ Ronald Reagan
- ☐ George W Bush
- ☐ Bill Clinton
- ☐ Ann Coulter
- ☐ George W Top Gun
- ☐ Donald Rumsfeld
- ☐ George HW Bush
- ☐ Dennis Miller
- ☐ Turkey Dinner Bush

Name _____
Address _____
City, State, Zip _____
Phone _____ Email _____
Payment By: __ Check __ MasterCard __ Visa
CC Number _____ Expires: ____
Signature _____



Order 3
(of any combination)
& we'll ship for free!

$29.99
each plus $8.95 S&H
CA Res add 7.75% sales tax

Please note: all of our action figures are in stock and ship the day we receive your order.

TalkingPresidents.com™

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Bad Poet, Bad Man

A hundred years of Pablo Neruda

By STEPHEN SCHWARTZ



Pablo Neruda

Condé Nast / CORBIS

The Chilean writer Pablo Neruda is "the greatest poet of the twentieth century—in any language." Or so said Gabriel García Márquez, in a line recently repeated by the *Washington Post* and several other American publications. Readers in the United States seem destined to have Neruda thrust upon them every few years, much as the cicadas return to whine and roar up and down the East Coast. The excuse this time is the centennial of Neruda's birth on July 12, 1904.

There is probably no more chance of halting this current binge of Neruda worship than there is of banishing the cicadas, but, still, the truth does need to be said: Pablo Neruda was a bad writer and a bad man. His main public is located not in the Spanish-speaking nations but in the Anglo-European countries, and his reputation derives almost entirely from the iconic place he once occupied in politics—which is to say, he's "the greatest poet of the twentieth century" because he was a Stalinist at exactly the right moment, and not because of his poetry, which is doggerel.

Stephen Schwartz, a frequent contributor to THE WEEKLY STANDARD, *also writes for leading periodicals in Spain and Latin America.*

Yes, his work is still plagiarized by teenage boys in Latin America, who see his *Twenty Love Poems and a Desperate Song* and figure there is nothing wrong with borrowing from it—just as one poem in the book is itself stolen from Rabindranath Tagore—and presenting its overwrought lines to their girlfriends. But if those boys grow up to be serious writers, they leave Neruda behind.

Nonetheless, the American progressive literary caste adores, adulates, and idolizes Neruda. He found the exact measure of his mediocrity in Robert Bly, beater of drums and perpetrator of vexingly atrocious verse, as translator. I admit to feeling a little sympathy for the dead Neruda once: When I discovered that his political poem *Que despierte el leñador*, in which Lincoln represents the Marxist element in the history of the United States, had been done into English by Bly. Awarded a Soviet "International Peace Prize" for 1950—and there's a phrase that should provoke considerable thought—the text was published in America by the Communist party with its title stirringly rendered as *Let the Railsplitter Awake!* Actually, Bly's title, *I Wish the Woodcutter Would Wake Up*, may be even more revealing.

In 1938, two singular men sat down to compose a statement about the situation of the global intellect as they then saw it. They wrote, among other things, "The totalitarian regime of the U.S.S.R., working through the so-called 'cultural' organizations it controls in other countries, has spread over the entire world a deep twilight hostile to every sort of spiritual value. A twilight of filth and blood in which, disguised as intellectuals and artists, those men steep themselves who have made servility a career, of lying for pay a custom, and of excuses for crime a source of pleasure." Nobody more embodied the phenomenon described in these lines

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

than Pablo Neruda. The description was written by the surrealist André Breton and the exiled Leon Trotsky.

Whatever may be said of the Trotskyists, neither their leader nor they themselves ever promoted bad art. And the essayists, authors, and critics who cleaved to Trotsky, including James T. Farrell, Sidney Hook, Mary McCarthy, Saul Bellow, Clement Greenberg, Harold Rosenberg, and a considerable number of others, were inspired by the words of Breton and Trotsky when, in 1939, some among them helped found the Committee for Cultural Freedom. Trotsky and his followers rejected the childish argument that leftist politics makes good writers and that authors of the right are necessarily heartless and mercenary.

The rise of Pablo Neruda may be the definitive example of the Soviet influence on art around the world. Late nineteenth-century poetry in Spanish was dominated by the inflated rhetoric of Rubén Darío, on whom Whitman and the French *Parnassiens* exercised a baleful influence. Then came the "Generation of '98," the group of extraordinary writers in Spain who, in the aftermath of that country's defeat in the Spanish-American war, carried out something comparable to the Imagist revolution of Pound and his contemporaries—clearing the exaggerated, gassy vocabulary of Rubén out of the idiom, replacing it by a clean, spare style as well as a harsh recognition of the realities that had befallen Spanish society and culture. They included some of the great modern classics of the language: Unamuno, Azorín, Ortega y Gasset, Pío Baroja, and Valle-Inclán.

Above all, Antonio Machado exemplified this new poetic diction in Spanish. The Generation of '98 had major echoes in Latin America, but also paved the way for the "Generation of 1927," which comprised a yet more brilliant constellation of poets, known for an even less cluttered modernist style: Pedro Salinas, Jorge Guillén, Gerardo Diego, Dámaso Alonso, Vicente Aleixandre, Federico García Lorca, Luis Cernuda, Rafael Alberti, Manuel Altolaguirre.

Bettmann / CORBIS

Neruda in 1943

To move from the lucid achievement of these extraordinary men to the pseudo-Whitmanese of Neruda represented an immense step backward for Spanish poetry; it meant a return to the lazy, overwrought excesses employed by imitators of Rubén Darío, without the solid Catholic values and connection to the Nicaraguan landscape found in Rubén and his better disciples (most of them known only among his fellow Nicaraguans). Everybody who knows Spanish literature recognizes this fact—everybody except a few academic demagogues and a large number of American newspaper reviewers, who are still responding to the reputation built for Neruda by the Soviet machine. The admirers of Neruda are tourists in their approach to Hispanic literature, like people who attend a flamenco dance performance and think they have seen Spain—but with a politically correct edge.

Neruda was a figure promoted to global literary stardom by the creators and bestowers of the Stalin Peace Prize, which he received in 1953. He was joined in this role with a group of writers, some of them once very gifted, whose talents faded when they sold themselves to Moscow. The best among them as writers, and therefore the worst morally, were the French ex-surrealist Louis Aragon, who before his communization was unquestionably the finest young prose stylist in his language, but who turned into a leaden pedant, authoring poems in praise of the Soviet secret police, along with his compatriot Paul Éluard, who followed the same path, endorsing the last Stalinist purges.

The Czech novelist Milan Kundera wrote, "I was shocked when, in 1950, the great French Communist poet Paul Éluard publicly approved the hanging of his friend, the Prague writer Zavis Kalandra. . . . When a great poet praises an execution, it is a blow that shatters our whole image of the world." Neruda, however, was not a great poet, even though he praised many executions and even participated in an assassination plot, while also helping consign anti-Communist leftists to the tender mercies of Adolf Hitler.

Naturally, these details are not to be found in the hagiographic articles that have poured forth in recent weeks on the occasion of the Neruda centenary. A few weeks ago, the London *Guardian* dramatically evoked Neruda's labors to relocate refugees from the defeated Spanish Republic. Officiating as a Chilean diplomat in Paris, Neruda assisted in hiring a ship, the *Winnipeg*, to convey 2,000 Spanish leftist exiles to Chile.

Adam Feinstein writes, "The *Winnipeg* left Pauillac, the port of Bordeaux, on August 4, 1939. Neruda stood on the dock, in his white hat, alongside his second-wife-to-be Delia del Carril, to wave the boat off. In the key poem, 'Explico algunas cosas' ('Let Me Explain a Few Things'), Neruda reveals that he has disowned his previous, inward-looking

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

self, together with any romantic, unworldly lyricism, and is now fully committed to his new role of truth-teller and exposer of the world's injustices."

A charming legend, but one hiding historical truths known in rather different terms to scholars. Neruda played the role of a reverse Schindler. Using his status as a diplomat, Neruda made sure that passports to board the *Winnipeg* went to refugees who shared his politics and beliefs, which were those of Joseph Stalin. Rejected refugees were then condemned to internment or death in France, which fell within a year into the hands of Hitler's rapidly advancing armies.

In his distinguished work *Beyond Death and Exile*, Louis Stein notes that the anarchists and anti-Communists "were given a disproportionately small share of the available places." A leading Spanish anti-Communist leftist, Federico Solano Palacio, went further, declaring that some 86 percent of the applications for transportation by anarchists were thrown out. Solano Palacio specifically cited the example of the *Winnipeg*. The Catalan labor historian Josep Peirats wrote in 1993: "Before World War II stopped all departures, [three ships] sailed to Veracruz, Mexico. Later on, the *Winnipeg* sailed to Chile. . . . These trips were administered by the Communists. . . . They granted or denied passports [and] strictly screened passengers at points of embarkation. The same procedure applied to transport to Chile, where Pablo Neruda, the Chilean poet . . . did the screening."

Neruda's services to Stalin did not end with this sorry episode. In May 1940, the Mexican Communist muralist David Alfaro Siqueiros, in a preview of a successful assassination three months later, led an armed attack on the Mexican residence of Trotsky, in which an American guard was kidnapped and murdered. Siqueiros, facing nine separate criminal charges, was released on bail. But soon after, Neruda helped arrange for him to get a Chilean passport. Siqueiros immediately fled Mexico, thus squelching a major part of the Mexican government's investigation of the anti-Trotsky conspiracy. For the rest of his life, Neruda expressed his undiluted pride in this action, which had led to his suspension from the Chilean diplomatic service.

Neruda never bothered to hide his great enthusiasm for Stalin. Upon the dictator's death in 1953, he wrote a threnody declaring:

To be men! That is the Stalinist law! . . .
We must learn from Stalin
his sincere intensity
his concrete clarity. . . .
Stalin is the noon,
the maturity of man and the peoples.
Stalinists, Let us bear this title with pride. . . .
Stalinist workers, clerks, women take care of this day!
The light has not vanished.
The fire has not disappeared,
There is only the growth of
Light, bread, fire and hope
In Stalin's invincible time!. . .
In recent years the dove,
Peace, the wandering persecuted rose,
Found herself on his shoulders
And Stalin, the giant,
Carried her at the heights of his forehead. . . .
A wave beats against the stones of the shore.
But Malenkov will continue his work.

This poem remains in print in Neruda's Spanish-language collected writings. It does not often appear in anthologies of his work in English.

In 1971, Neruda got the Nobel Prize, which he had sought for years and the denial of which he complains about in *Il Postino*, the 1994 Italian film based on his later life. The award of his Nobel came much to the disgust of certain members of the selection committee, who could not forget his actions in behalf of the Soviet dictatorship. But his Swedish translator, Artur Lundkvist, from the moment he was elected to the Nobel Academy in 1968, made it his business to get the Chilean the prize.

When *Il Postino* came out, it was said that Bill Clinton and Al Gore were among its most enthusiastic fans, and that Clinton even went so far as to buy, as a birthday present for Hillary, a copy of *Love: Ten Poems by Pablo Neruda*. But what serious reason can justify allowing the continued transformation of this loathsome figure, vain and selfish, ambitious and unctuous in his service to a totalitarian regime, into a champion of Spanish literature?

And yet, here is Carolyn Curiel in the *New York Times* this July 6: "That Pablo Neruda was the greatest poet of the last century is beyond argument in much of South America." In fact, the more honest of his fellow Chileans express great resentment that Neruda's Nobel overshadows that awarded in 1945 to another Chilean poet, Gabriela Mistral, unknown north of the Rio Grande today, and many of them argue that yet another Chilean modernist, Vicente Huidobro, was a thousand times better and more important to world literature than Neruda. Huidobro compared Neruda, unfavorably, to a tango dancer.

This summer the *Chronicle of Higher Education* gave space to Ilan Stavans, a Mexican-born professor at Amherst, to make a new anointing of Neruda as the savior of Hispanic literature. Along the way, Stavans had the nerve to proclaim that Neruda's adherence to the Communist party made him "the spokesman for the enslaved." Is this not, perhaps, a misprint, overlooked by the proofreaders at the *Chronicle of Higher Education*? The Communists were enslavers, as the whole world, except perhaps Professor Stavans, now admits. We must ask, can one really consider Neruda a finer poet than Paul Celan, who survived a fascist concentration camp, or Osip Mandelstam, who died in the Gulag?

Such comparisons are worse than distasteful; they border on the obscene. Federico García Lorca said of Neruda, "he is closer to blood than to ink;" it was an insight of great depth, far beyond its author's knowing—and today, unbelievably enough, the reputation of García Lorca has been annexed to, and overshadowed by, that of Neruda. It is time to treat Pablo Neruda as the French surrealists once recommended dealing with another Nobel laureate, Anatole France: Let us box up his memory with his books and throw the whole thing away. As Breton wrote, "There is no reason that, once dead, this man should create any more dust." ♦

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Life, Italian Style

An Englishman looks at Italy and sees the horror, the horror. BY STEPHEN BARBARA

When Tobias Jones moved from England to Italy in 1999, he expected to find the pastoral bliss described by centuries of poets. On the evidence of this book, it appears that Jones passed his time in Parma sipping Chianti, chatting about Renaissance art, visiting ruins, eating four-course *pranzi*, and admiring Italian women. Which is exactly how one expects a man of culture from a bleak, uncivilized Protestant country to behave.

The Dark Heart of Italy
by Tobias Jones
North Point, 272 pp., $24

Had Jones written his book solely on the basis of these diversions, he likely would have produced a sentimental portrait of Italian life. But, in the best reforming spirit (Jones's Italian friends called him *il calvinista*, "the Calvinist"), he resolved not to be seduced by the dazzling exterior of Italy, but to probe its soul, its "dark heart." There he found, among other things, a society of criminality, injustice, civil war, and terrorism—with, at the very top, prime minister Silvio Berlusconi.

First released in Britain in 2003, Jones's *The Dark Heart of Italy* caused an uproar in Italy, where several members of Berlusconi's Forza Italia party denounced Jones, improbably, as a "foreign Trotskyist" and member of a worldwide left-wing conspiracy to defame the prime minister. When an Italian translation of the book was finally printed this year (not before the book had become the bestselling English-language book in Italian retail history), men close to Berlusconi once again publicly rebuked Jones. Meantime, the Italian public, always unpatriotic, enthusiastically greeted Jones's criticisms of its country. Now that the American edition has appeared, readers here will be able to judge for themselves whether this book is really an unfair attack on Italy or, as Jones intends it, a deeper look at the country than has been taken by previous observers.

In truth, much of *The Dark Heart of Italy* is conventional travel writing. Jones spends ample time in the book celebrating the numerous happy virtues of Italian life and lamenting the absence of these in England. He cherishes the generous, lively, "exquisitely refined," and intelligent character of the average Italian. He dilates upon the excellent food and asserts that life in Italy, with its leisurely pace, with its time devoted to intellectual conversation, is much more civilized than life in England. And he takes care to notice little things that, in his home country, would seem unusual: "The care put into buying shoes, tablecloths, handbags, and clothes is extraordinary. . . . Even at two in the morning, groups of women gather outside shop-windows and discuss the width of sandal straps in the same amicably heated way that old men discuss Verdi."

But the most interesting parts of the book are those that provocatively examine other aspects of Italian life. Typically, Jones introduces a certain facet of Italian life, recollects his positive first impressions about it, and then explains how, in time, he discovered the grim realities underneath. So, for instance, in the chapter on learning how to speak Italian: Jones says at first he enjoyed the euphonious sound of Italian, and the zestful, expressive use of hand gestures he witnessed in Italian conversations. (He even admired the flair Italians showed for insult.) But then it turns out that Italian was not so happy a language. He found that getting others to believe him was not a matter of plain speaking, but one of being studiedly pompous and orotund (*parlantina*, this is called). He discovered that the most humdrum people demanded to be addressed by ridiculous titles ("every graduate is called 'doctor,' . . . a weather forecaster has to be at least lieutenant colonel"). And too


Silvio Berlusconi

Landov

Stephen Barbara is a writer in Hoboken, New Jersey.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

often, he saw that only an obsequious style of speaking helped him get his way with officials and petty bureaucrats. The delight of learning the language gave way to frustration.

In the chapter on Italian soccer, Jones records a similar experience: At first he gushed at the precise, technical, elegant style of the Italian game. But later he discovered that soccer in Italy, as a business, is frequently racked by scandals involving ineligible players, drugs, racism, shady accounting, and financial crises. Likewise in the chapter on Italian capitalism ("Fewer Taxes for Everyone"), Jones begins with praise for Italy's highly skilled artisan class, only to say that Italy's extensive black economy and favor-based labor system make the country hostile to foreign investment. Another chapter exposes Italy's slow, ineffective justice system; still another attacks Italian television. Jones also records his painful confusion at the political terrorism that rends the country. Ills in Italy are never met with reform, and crimes never lead to punishment. As the Italians say, *non paga nessuno*—no one pays.

But the thread that runs through the book, connecting the different chapters, is Silvio Berlusconi, Italy's prime minister since May 2001. Permanently tanned, rich, and a ladies' man with the nickname "the Great Seducer," Berlusconi has a sunny charm that is not lost on Jones.

But, though conceding him high personal qualities, Jones offers criticisms of Berlusconi that might have come straight from the most corrosive issues of the *Economist* (which has devoted several issues to attacking Berlusconi). The prime minister is accused of perjury, money-laundering, pressuring journalists, bribing judges, sacrificing the common good of the country to his own interests, and ignoring civil rights. The British edition of the book ran, on its cover, a photograph of Berlusconi "standing on a balcony in Milan, smiling at his adulatory supporters, looking uncannily like Benito Mussolini."

In the end, though, *The Dark Heart of Italy* remains the work of a foreigner, for its avowed intention of discovering the soul of Italy is never achieved. Jones's criticisms recognize that something is not right but cannot reach down to the underlying causes. This is especially clear in the chapter on Italy's "Slaughter Commission," in which Jones seems mainly to quote the writing of others. Only in the chapter on Catholicism in Italy, which recalls a moving visit Jones paid to Piedmont (where a Protestant minority lives), is any truly illuminating work done.

Still, *The Dark Heart of Italy* partakes of the tradition of bold cultural writing. It is reminiscent of such works as Edmund Wilson's *Europe Without Baedeker* and V.S. Naipaul's *Among the Believers*. Interestingly, multiculturalism, which seeks to open one's eyes to other cultures and to induce modesty about one's heritage, has not led to much rich travel writing.

In avoiding the decadence of most travel writing, which treats countries from the point of view of their beaches and ice cream shops, Jones has achieved one of his central goals, which was to go beneath the surface. But whether he found the heart of Italy, or only new illusions, is a different question. ♦

Art for Art's Sake

Why Terry Teachout is a great critic.

BY KELLY JANE TORRANCE

Terry Teachout is that rare thing: a cultural critic who believes in free markets. But he is also a free-marketeer who believes that the market has coarsened American culture. He writes occasionally about pop culture, even at times celebrates it, but he insists that standards exist—that Schubert is better than *The Sopranos*.

A Terry Teachout Reader
by Terry Teachout
Yale University Press, 438 pp., $38

A Terry Teachout Reader is a selection from fifteen years' worth of essays, mostly from the *New York Times*, *Commentary*, the *New Criterion*, and *National Review* (and THE WEEKLY STANDARD, as well). Teachout is one of America's most thoughtful critics. He's also one of its most polymathic. He writes about *everything*: music, dance, theater, literature, painting, film, television.

Nowhere is Teachout more different than his colleagues, perhaps, than in his reason for believing art important. It is, put simply, that art transcends this world. Art's unity, Teachout argues, "reminds us of the hidden presence of superworldly order amid the seeming chaos of our wounded world." This explains why Teachout is so good on the "conversion" of America's foremost chronicler of materialism, Tom Wolfe, and why he can say, in an essay about the western actor Randolph Scott: "This message rings truer still as we look back on a century that might have been designed for the sole purpose of dramatizing the truth of Dostoyevsky's terrible warning, 'If there is no God, then anything is permitted, even cannibalism.'"

Marilyn Monroe knew Randolph Scott, of course, but she also knew of Dostoyevsky. At least she said she did, but that broad culture—in which one had at least to pretend to have read Dostoyevsky—died not long after she did. "I grew up in the Age of the Middlebrow, that earnest, self-improving fellow who watched prime-time documentaries and read the Book of the

Kelly Jane Torrance is arts and culture editor of Brainwash.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Yale University Press

Terry Teachout

Month," Teachout writes. "That was me, in spades."

The middlebrow culture of the mid-century brought New York to Teachout's own small-town Missouri. It brought art to places without galleries or even bookstores. The Book-of-the-Month Club, for example, brought to Teachout such books as Nabokov's *Pale Fire*, Evelyn Waugh's *Scoop*, and Anthony Burgess's *Earthly Powers*. Ed Sullivan brought America not only Elvis Presley, but also ballerina Margot Fonteyn and diva Maria Callas, who performed a scene from *Tosca*, fully staged.

One of the other virtues of middlebrow culture was that it was popular. Everybody watched *The Ed Sullivan Show*. Everybody knew who Norman Mailer was. All Americans, to a certain extent, participated in a shared culture, and this culture in turn unified America. To be "American" really meant something, culturally. Now, Teachout argues, culture has become atomized, catering to every possible niche interest. Many free-marketeers, especially libertarians, applaud this new cultural diversity. But not Teachout: "The information age offers something for anybody: *Survivor* for simpletons, *The Sopranos* for sophisticates. The problem is that it offers nothing for everybody." Teachout misses Midcult, despite its pretension, social climbing, and eat-your-peas ponderousness.

Thus it happens that a man who loves the work of George Balanchine also celebrates the Three Tenors. Along with the schmaltz, after all, the Tenors bring Verdi and Puccini to a mass audience. Teachout warns us of the dangers of romanticizing middlebrow culture, but it's hard to see his cheerleading for the Pavarotti-Domingo-Carreras combine as anything but that. He admits that they have not created a new audience for the moribund classical music industry. In fact, the Tenors' great success paved the way for the utter triumph of the "crossover act"—classical musicians (and not so classical, like Donny Osmond) peddling pop piffle to audiences that don't know Mozart from Mahler. The crossover act is usually skinny, sexy, scantily clad, and callow—and almost always under thirty. They are far more likely to cite Céline Dion than Maria Callas as an influence. The Three Tenors never encouraged their fans to broaden their knowledge of music; they only encouraged the ostensible guardians of that heritage to pander to the people in a futile attempt to sell more records. So perhaps the culture is not so atomized as Teachout thinks. Every musician, from classical to country, must now incorporate pop to sell records.

But how good would a critic be if one never disagreed with him? Teachout, no matter the subject, is always thoughtful, frequently charming, and sometimes as doughty as an Old Testament prophet. To collect a critic between hard covers is to test whether he is more than ephemeral. *A Terry Teachout Reader* passes that test. In spades. ♦

Death Duties

The role of religion in the rise of eugenics.

BY WESLEY J. SMITH

Eugenics—now, there's one of those words that has a dated, distant sound: a remnant of Victorian arrogance that got taken up by the Nazis and made an excuse for murder. But that is ancient history. *We* would never stoop to such evil. *We* have learned better than to think some people have lives not worth living.

Preaching Eugenics
Religious Leaders and the American Eugenics Movement
by Christine Rosen
Oxford University Press, 296 pp., $35

Or, at least, we're too embarrassed to call it "eugenics" any more. The movement got its start from the English statistician Francis Galton in the second half of the nineteenth century. Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin, became convinced the human race was degrading because the birthrate among "unfit" people was high. To remedy this crisis, Galton, inspired by Darwin's theories and Gregor Mendel's work in genetics, proposed that society take control of human evolution and save the race through a "positive eugenics" in which eugenically superior people would be encouraged to mate and procreate bountifully.

Eugenics—the word means "good birth"—quickly crossed the Atlantic finding fertile soil among the Ameri-

Wesley J. Smith is a senior fellow at the Discovery Institute and a special consultant to the Center for Bioethics and Culture. His next book, Consumer's Guide to a Brave New World, *will be published in the fall.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Bettmann / CORBIS

Francis Galton in 1886

can elite. But American eugenicists concluded that more drastic measures were required than merely promoting eugenically proper marriages to accomplish the cleansing task the Eugenics Movement had set for itself. Funded abundantly by progressive philanthropic foundations such as the Carnegie Institute and led by biologist Charles Davenport—a forgotten figure, but one of the real villains of the twentieth century—American eugenicists developed a theory of "negative eugenics," in which the unfit were to be prevented from procreating by the state.

"Unfit," in this context meant people with congenital disabilities or supposedly genetic failings such as alcoholism or sexual immorality. And the movement was successful enough that many state governments legalized involuntary eugenic sterilization, a violation of human rights that was given the explicit sanction of the Supreme Court in the notorious 1927 decision *Buck* v. *Bell*. Between 1908 and 1960, some seventy thousand Americans were involuntarily sterilized.

Much has been written, and well, in recent years about this scandalous era, most recently by Edwin Black in his splendid *War Against the Weak*. In her interesting new history *Preaching Eugenics*, Christine Rosen focuses instead on the little known and shameful promotion of eugenics by a surprisingly large number of American ecclesiastics. Take, for example, the Reverend Washington Gladden, a leader in the "Social Gospel" movement, who asserted in 1926 that Christianity "must be a religion less concerned about getting men to heaven than about fitting them for their proper work on earth." Christians who agreed—mostly within mainline Protestantism, as it happens—found it surprisingly easy to support the eugenics movement's attempt to promote social virtue by controlling procreation as part of their overarching embrace of "progressive" social reform. Those who believed the first duty of Christians is to save souls tended to oppose eugenics as a threat to the lives of the weak and vulnerable, an unwarranted interference with the sanctity of marriage, and a pernicious assault on the intrinsic preciousness of human life.

Before reading Rosen's *Preaching Eugenics*, I had assumed the churches resisted eugenics almost uniformly—and no doubt been subjected to withering criticisms from modernist public personages, academics, and members of the science establishment, the primary boosters of the pseudoscience from the late nineteenth century on. But, as Rosen ably demonstrates, history is rarely that simple.

The Social Gospel movement, led mostly by Congregationalist and Unitarian ministers, grew rapidly in these years among mainline Protestant churches. The Social Gospel reconceived Christianity as being less about faith and salvation, and more about, as Rosen writes, "ushering in the Kingdom of God on earth through [social] reform and service."

Many Social Gospel adherents viewed eugenics as God's plan to reconcile the truths of science with the Bible. Toward this end, Bible verses were reinterpreted and found to contain what had theretofore been secret eugenics messages. Thus, in one minister's sermon, Noah's flood was God's own eugenics policy for eliminating a human race that had degraded and become inferior. Others insisted that Christ's Parable of the Talents was actually about improving the population: In eugenics exegeses, "Whoever has will be given more; whoever does not have, even what he thinks he has will be taken from him," took on a whole new meaning.

While some notable leaders of the broader eugenics movement kept their distance from all things religious, the American Eugenics Society recognized the importance of church leaders in selling eugenics theory to average Americans. Toward this end, the soci-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ety appointed the Reverend Harry Emerson Fosdick, whose radio program, *National Vespers*, reached two or three million listeners each week, to its advisory council. Securing the endorsement of one of the nation's most famous preachers, Fosdick's endorsement was a major coup for eugenics.

The American Eugenics Society's Committee on Cooperation with Clergymen also sponsored eugenics sermon contests, open to all ministers, priests, rabbis, and theology students. The sermon had to be preached to a regular congregation in a church or synagogue, and the minister had to take up the question, "Religion and Eugenics: Does the church have any responsibility for improving the human stock?" The prizes ranged up to $500, a hefty sum in the mid 1920s.

Many lay popularizers of eugenics also appealed to religious traditions to promote their agenda. The most notable, it seems, was Albert Edward Wiggam, who traveled the lecture circuit promoting eugenics as "the final program for the complete Christianization of mankind." Wiggam even rewrote the Ten Commandments, in which "The Duty of Eugenics" replaced "Thou shalt have no other gods before me." The "Duty of Scientific Research" supplanted the proscription against making graven images, while the "Duty of Preferential Reproduction" replaced "Thou shalt not kill."

Resisters of such evil movements often receive too little attention in histories of this kind. And indeed, Rosen gives religious opponents of eugenics—mostly evangelical Protestants and Catholics—far shorter shrift than she does religious boosters. G.K. Chesterton offered the most scathing assessment of eugenics, she tells us. Unfortunately, Rosen devotes only two paragraphs to his critique. I would like to have seen more. Pope Pius XI's encyclical from December 31, 1930, was highly critical of eugenics sterilization and marriage bans, and complained that eugenicists had forgotten "men are begotten not for the earth and for time, but for heaven and eternity." In 1932, entering the fray from the left, Reinhold Niebuhr added his considerable influence to the opposition, publishing *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, which pointedly challenged liberal Protestants' uncritical embrace of science and eugenics as the primary sources of solutions to social problems.

Bettmann / CORBIS

A 1930s eugenics diploma granted by Mussolini to an Italian mother for "good breeding."

Within the next few years, the tide shifted, and eugenics in America ebbed. Once World War II was over, and we had clear revelations of the extent to which eugenics theory had undergirded the Holocaust, eugenics became thoroughly discredited.

All the time I was reading Rosen's *Preaching Eugenics*—learning the extent to which religious leaders supported a movement that, in a most unchristian way, victimized the weakest and most vulnerable—I kept wondering: Did these supporters of eugenics ever repent? Many of these advocates lived well beyond World War II. It would have been very interesting to learn what these mostly well-intentioned religious leaders thought about their past advocacy in later years.

Another thought kept popping into my mind while I read the book. Rosen describes a "clear pattern" of religious leaders' supporting eugenics "precisely when they moved away from traditional religious tenets."

Recent years have seen a rebirth of eugenic thought, with advocacy for eugenic abortion, human cloning, and the drive to learn how to "enhance" the human genome. This phenomenon seems to be repeating itself in the contemporary divisions among churches over social issues such as abortion, euthanasia, embryonic stem-cell research, and therapeutic cloning—agendas that, like eugenics, undercut belief in the sanctity of human life.

Considering the history of liberal religion's embrace of eugenics, this "new eugenics" once again threatens the vulnerable with the pernicious notion that some human lives have greater moral value than others. Christine Rosen's *Preaching Eugenics* could not be more relevant. ♦

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Books in Brief

***Queen of the Turtle Derby and Other Southern Phenomena* by Julia Reed (Random House, 180 pp., $22.95).** In *Queen of the Turtle Derby*, *Vogue* writer and Mississippi native Julia Reed claims that the South "lends itself—hurls itself really—to caricature." She builds an amusing case, describing such real-life characters as the attorney general in Louisiana who argued chickens aren't animals; the Atlanta woman who saw Jesus in a Pizza Hut billboard; and the country singer who said his fried lobster tail wasn't fattening since it only sat in hot oil for a minute or two.

The book's twenty-two essays are drawn mostly from *Vogue* and the *New York Times* magazine. Particularly witty is "Mysterious Ways," in which Reed writes that southerners subscribe to John Keats's concept of negative capability. Southerners know that "man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason." If they can't hold God responsible for whatever strange thing has happened, there's always that old standby, the Devil. "It's easier than trying to figure out why we lost the war, why we remain generally impoverished and infested with mosquitoes and snakes and flying termites."

Darker essays present the paradox of the South being the area of the country where violent crime is most rampant—and simultaneously the most religious region of the nation. Others examine the southern preoccupation with pageantry (the book's title alludes to this), dating in the South, and southerners' zest for country cooking. *Queen of the Turtle Derby* is a breezy read that helps explain just what goes on below the Mason-Dixon Line.

—Rachel DiCarlo

***1912: Wilson, Roosevelt, Taft & Debs—The Election That Changed the Country* by James Chace (Simon & Schuster, 323 pp., $25.95).** The presidential election of 1912 was one of the pivotal elections in American history, transforming politics for decades. As James Chace argues in his well-researched account, the 1912 contest "introduced a conflict between progressive idealism . . . and conservative values" that still exists.

The 1912 election was a clash of giants, pitting four of the most formidable figures in American public life—Roosevelt, Taft, Wilson, and Debs—against each other. Chace's portrait of Roosevelt is especially engaging. When Taft, the protégé Roosevelt had handpicked to succeed him, failed to carry out progressive policies, Roosevelt decided he would challenge Taft. Rejected by the Republican party convention, Roosevelt abandoned the GOP and ran as the candidate of a new third party, the Bull Moose Progressives, thus ensuring Wilson's "accidental election" with only 41 percent of the popular vote. In vivid detail, Chace recounts Roosevelt's spectacular coast-to-coast whistle-stop campaigning.

Chace's discussion of the personalities and rivalries of these four presidential contenders is both provocative and illuminating, leaving few aspects of their private prejudices or public careers unexamined. Thus, for example, Chace discusses the liberal Wilson's deep-seated racism, concluding that Wilson "never abandoned his condescending attitude" toward African Americans, and was "in essence a white supremacist, holding a romantic view of the courtesy and graciousness of the antebellum Southern plantation owners." Rich in its historical insights, anecdotes, and analysis, *1912* makes a wonderful read, especially in a presidential election year such as this.

—David G. Dalin

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Saddam Hussein, in jail, reportedly said little of value.
—News item

Updated: 11:10 a.m. ET

TRANSCRIPT: "HARDBALL with Chris Matthews"

CHRIS MATTHEWS, HOST: For seven months U.S. forces have had former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein in custody and interrogators couldn't get a peep out of him. Well, all I can say is that he's never been up against this program, where nobody gets outta here without coming clean. Okay, it's high noon. Let's play Hardball. Mr. Hussein, weapons of mass destruction. You had 'em or didn't have 'em? Go.

SADDAM HUSSEIN: Ah, well, okay, yes, I had a weapons program and—

MATTHEWS: Okay, well, having them is one thing. Have. Had. The White House, Scooter Libby and that whole gang, has been playing that same semantics game for months. People want to know—and Jimmy Carter used to tell me this all the time—who's really spittin' up the cotton. Simple yes or no.

HUSSEIN: Yes, the weapons are hidden in a village in one of the remote areas of my country, the village of—

MATTHEWS: You know, you spend any time in the Peace Corps like I did, you see a lot of poor villages. You can learn a lot just by standing around watching a guy dig in the dirt with a stick. I think the American people understand that. Let me ask you about hiding in a spider hole. Who hid you?

HUSSEIN: People from my tribal community mostly, and—

MATTHEWS: Let me tell you, I worked on the Hill for Frank Moss of Utah, I worked for Ed Muskie. But one thing Tip O'Neill taught me was that all politics are local. It's that constituency you go back to time and again in a crisis. Dance with the one who brung ya. A lot of people out there in public service never get it. Okay, let's get right to the heart of the matter. Osama bin Laden. Know him? Ever met him?

HUSSEIN: Yes, the fact is that I've known Osama for some time. We first joined forces to—

MATTHEWS: Yeah. Understood. Back in Philly where I grew up we had a saying, "the friend of my friend is the enemy of the guy across the street." We had a lot of sayings like that where I came from. I didn't know anybody. I wasn't connected. I went to Holy Cross and learned from the Jesuits, real gutsy guys. Let me ask you this. Howard Fineman, Frank Rich, and a bunch of us who appear on Imus are asking—and we don't have much time left—how does this all play out? You've got the whole abuse thing, the war, the credibility gap. You've got trade, New Europe, you've got polls showing Ohio and Missouri dead even, you've got people out there hoping to resonate with someone, you've got corporate America robbing people blind, you've got Michael Moore and that whole yard sale. Let me ask you in the five seconds we have left: Who would you rather sit next to on a 13-hour flight back to prison, Dick Cheney or John Edwards?

HUSSEIN: Uh—

MATTHEWS: Okay. One second. Tell me something I don't already know.

HUSSEIN: Ah, I smuggled zillions of dollars out of Iraq that are now in bank accounts in—

MATTHEWS: —YOU'RE WATCHING HARDBALL! Anyway, thanks for coming on. Join us tomorrow when my guest will be famed recluse J.D. Salinger. Tune in as we crack him open like an egg.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Confronting Affirmative Action

HOOVER DIGEST
RESEARCH AND OPINION ON PUBLIC POLICY

SUBSCRIBE
Receive four quarterly issues at the introductory rate of $20.

FREE ISSUE
Receive a complimentary issue of the latest Digest without obligation.

Call 800.935.2882 or visit www.hooverdigest.org

Paid for by the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

Because the administration argued against the two specific University of Michigan affirmative action plans before the Supreme Court last year, few appreciated at the time how much of the constitutional principle of Equal Protection it was willing to sacrifice. For example, Solicitor General Theodore Olson argued in his brief, "[T]his case requires this Court to break no new ground," in effect conceding that race preferences to achieve diversity, articulated in the Bakke case a generation ago, remained good law. And, said Olson, while not considering race per se, a school might consider such matters as "a history of overcoming disadvantage, geographic origin, socioeconomic status, challenging living or family situation," and a host of other technically race-neutral factors. Got the point (wink, wink)?

The solicitor also pointed with pride to the "percentage plan," adopted by Texas under the Bush governorship. The plan got around a circuit court decision barring race-conscious university admissions by automatically admitting high school students from any public high school graduating in the top 10 percent of their class.

Now comes word, via the *New York Times,* of widespread dissatisfaction with the Texas percentage plan. The reason is the plan's built-in bias in favor of students' graduating from low-achievement schools and against those in the tougher academic institutions where many superior students fail to make the top 10 percent. As a result, many turned down by the flagship University of Texas take their talents to other states.

This problem was totally predictable at the time the law was passed, as were many others inherent in percentage plans. For one thing, to "cure" the racial imbalance problem, they rely on a foundation of de facto segregated high schools. For another, they have no applicability to graduate schools or to private or out-of-state high schools.

The diversity approach sanctioned by the Court, to which dozens of colleges and universities are now scrambling to adjust, has its own set of problems. **Diversity itself is a vague concept since it can relate to philosophical viewpoint, religious conviction, and areas of academic interest as easily as to race or ethnicity.** Diversity is also subject to diminishing returns. The first African American in a history or political science course arguably could bring important perspectives to bear on many subjects. But what about the 2nd? Or the 17th? And suppose the course were biology? Or chemical engineering? Or medicine? There is at this point overwhelming evidence that affirmative action at medical schools has produced lower-achieving students who take longer to graduate, do less well on the medical boards, and materially less well in qualifying to practice their specialties.

As a matter of principle I continue to oppose the allocation of rights and rewards based on race. I wish the administration had shown a bit more spunk in the leading Michigan cases. But a decade of attention to this area also persuades me that this society is unwilling to accept the results of a race-neutral approach—without gimmicks or outright intellectual fraud—to college admissions. For that reason I believe the least harmful approach is a straightforward affirmative action plan modified to avert harm to innocent nonminority students. This could be achieved by enrolling one nonminority student who would otherwise have been rejected for each minority student enrolled through affirmative action. **It is time to restore integrity to issues of race and university admissions.**

—Robert Zelnick

Robert Zelnick is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and chairman of the Department of Journalism at Boston University.

HOOVER INSTITUTION

. . . ideas defining a free society

Hoover Institution Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305-6010 Tel: 877.466.8374 Fax: 650.723.1687 info@hoover.stanford.edu www.hoover.org

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Investing in communities starts with helping others.

That's why we created Home Loan Learning Center.

Our members lend the money that helps create safe and stable American communities, and have done so for decades. Now we've taken the next step—providing access to clear, simple and unbiased information about the entire homebuying process.

It's all at our new consumer web site, the home loan learning center at **www.homeloanlearningcenter.com.** We feel one of the best things we can do—for your constituents, for our members' customers—is to empower people to form those very communities in which we invest.

www.homeloanlearningcenter.com
(800) 793-6222

MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION
Investing in communities

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED